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ABSTRACT
Any useful computer system performs communication and any communication must be parsed before
it is computed upon. Given their importance, one might expect parsers to receive a significant share
of attention from the security community. This is, however, not the case: bugs in parsers continue
to account for a surprising portion of reported and exploited vulnerabilities.
In this thesis, I propose a methodology for supporting the development of software that depends
on parsers—such as anything connected to the Internet—to safely support any reasonably designed
protocol: data structures to describe protocol messages; validation routines that check that data
received from the wire conforms to the rules of the protocol; systems that allow a defender to inject
arbitrary, crafted input so as to explore the effectiveness of the parser; and systems that allow for
the observation of the parser code while it is being explored.
Then, I describe principled method of producing parsers that automatically generates the myriad
parser-related software from a description of the protocol. This has many significant benefits: it
makes implementing parsers simpler, easier, and faster; it reduces the trusted computing base to the
description of the protocol and the program that compiles the description to runnable code; and it
allows for easier formal verification of the generated code.
I demonstrate the merits of the proposed methodology by creating a description of the USB
protocol using a domain-specific language (DSL) embedded in Haskell and integrating it with the
FreeBSD operating system. Using the industry-standard umap test-suite, I measure the performance
and efficacy of the generated parser. I show that it is stable, that it is effective at protecting a system
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Protocols are rules by which two or more entities communicate to accomplish some task. In the
context of computing, these entities are software or hardware and the tasks may be as mundane as
transferring a file between two computers or as complex as many people playing a real-time game.
Protocols such as IP [50] achieve the goal of sending arbitrary data across the Internet; USB [25]
allows a multitude of different devices to plug into the same physical port on a computer; ELF [16]
lets a compiler describe a program in such a way that the kernel can run it; proprietary protocols
enable players to shoot virtual rocket launchers at each other from across the globe. In short, to say
protocols are ubiquitous would run the risk of underselling them.
The protocols used by modern computers are constantly evolving: new ones are being developed
and old ones are being repurposed; it is unrealistic to assume either will ever stop happening. Old
protocols are frequently re-implemented (for example, in embedded systems) and introduce new,
potentially vulnerable artifacts into the wild. At the same time, new protocols bring their own set of
baggage to the security table because with them come new specifications, new implementations, and
therefore new vulnerabilities. Engineers have been developing, implementing, and deploying new
protocols for decades and yet still we see new vulnerabilities and exploits against them (Chapter 2
contains a survey).
1.1 Ubiquity of Ad-Hoc Protocol Parsing
In all protocols, otherwise-meaningless bits are communicated via some medium and meaning must
be applied to them by the receiving entity. In IP, this is the opaque payload carried by the underlying
link layer; in USB, these are the typeless bits flying over the physical wire; in ELF, this is the inert
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0100 0101 0000 0000
0110 1010 0100 0000
0000 0000 0100 0000
...
Parser
src address = 192.168.0.2
dst address = 192.168.0.1
...
Figure 1.1: A parser takes an untyped, opaque bytestream and imposes meaning on it according to
the protocol specification (in this example, the Internet Protocol [50]) before handing it off to the
kernel for interpretation.
file sitting on disk. The protocol specification defines both the syntax of this communication—the
grouping of individual bits within an otherwise-opaque datastream into distinct, typed fields—as
well as the semantics—how to interpret and respond to the various fields delineated by the syntactic
rules. Figure 1.1 shows a stylized representation of the parser’s job in, e.g., the Internet Protocol [50].
The component responsible for implementing a protocol syntax is called a parser and often sits
directly between the medium carrying the opaque data and the code implementing the communi-
cation semantics. One might be tempted to dismiss parsers as trivial pieces of software that don’t
merit much attention. This is far from the case, however. The parser is the key front-end component
responsible for deriving meaning from input: for applying semantics to raw bits: for guarding the
passage between the untrusted outside world and the vulnerable internals. It’s what takes a stream
of opaque bits from the ether and decides they comprise a 32-bit unsigned big-endian integer or
a stream of null-terminated 8-bit ASCII characters and so on. Put another way, the parser takes
arbitrary, untyped data and imposes on it a type before passing that datum on to the rest of the
system for further processing.
Frequently, the “rest of the system” implicitly trusts the type that the parser has imposed; the
venerable buffer overflow attack exemplifies this trust as well as its fragility. (This perspective,
in fact, applies to most memory corruption attacks [40].) One view of such an attack is that the
vulnerable function assumed the parser was delivering a null-terminated string of length no more
than x when in fact it made no such guarantee. In the case of stack-based buffer overflows, this
allows a nefarious (or incompetent) input-provider to overwrite portions of the stack and disrupt
execution [45]. Such exploits cannot occur when the characteristics of data guaranteed by the parser
match the data-consumer’s expectations about it.
While they are near-mythic at this point, stack-based buffer overflows such as described in
AlephOne’s seminal paper [45] are by no means the only vulnerabilities that would be prevented by
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mindful implementation of parsers. In 1998, Thomas Ptacek and Timothy Newsham showed that
parsers in TCP/IP stacks of popular operating systems were sufficiently varied and idiosyncratic
in their behavior that it was possible to craft a single packet or packet stream which would be
interpreted in completely different ways by the different hosts [52, 30]. Thus, any system behaving
as a firewall or intrusion-detection system must simulate the behavior of all systems under its
protection, lest the protector inadvertently allow packets through that tickle a vulnerability in
one [55].
SQL injection vulnerabilities [44] are yet another example of the importance of parsers: code
within the application combines user input with preconstructed SQL query fragments under the
assumption that the input contains no single-quotes. It is too easy to skip parsing here—after all,
the input is ASCII text and the query is ASCII text, so what parsing is necessary?—but the input is
implicitly blessed nonetheless and therefore trusted by the query engine. Actively parsing the user
input fixes this class of vulnerability, not least because it forces the developer to explicitly encode
the assumptions the rest of their code is making [48].
All systems that accept input—that is, all even-vaguely useful systems—implicitly or explicitly
include parsers. These parsers verify the correctness of the input before passing it to other com-
ponents that process said input. If the parser is not correct, it will permit incorrect input to pass
through, and the other components will perform incorrect operations. At best, these incorrect oper-
ations waste time; at worst, they allow a clever input-provider to take control of the entire system.
So how can we make parsers better?
1.2 A Better Way
To guide our steps towards producing more-secure parsers, let us consider what is involved in the
code that implements parsing.
First, we need to define the data structures that reflect the structure of the protocol messages.
An instance of such a data structure is, in fact, the result of parsing, as shown in Figure 1.1.
Furthermore, the consumer of the parsed data (be it the kernel, in the case of, e.g., IP or USB;
or a userland program in the case of an application-level protocol) needs some way to refer to the
various parsed fields. Since the overwhelming majority of kernel code remains C, collecting all those
fields together in an instance of a C struct is the natural solution. Additionally, a C struct is the
easiest basis from which to create a C++, Java, or Python object should the data consumer prefer
a different format.
3
pass in quick on em0 proto tcp from any to any port 22 to 10.0.1.6
pass out quick on rl0 proto tcp from any to any port 80
pass in log on em0 proto {tcp ,udp} from any to any
Figure 1.2: Policies written for the pf IP firewall. Note that they include both a description of the
data using protocol-specific terminology (i.e., protocol type, port number, IP address) as well as an
action (e.g., “pass in”) to take if the description matches.
With types and corresponding data structure defined, we then need code that performs the
actual parsing: it must read in a bytestream or a fixed-size frame and produce an instance of the
protocol-message data structure. It should verify that the fields of the data structure conform to the
requirements laid out in the protocol specification. If the input violates the rules of the protocol,
the parser should report an error. Otherwise, the parser should return a well-formed member of the
given type.
In addition to ensuring conformance to the protocol specification, ideally any parser would also
support the ability to apply a user-specified filtering policy to incoming data, to reject certain
inputs known to be troublesome. The canonical instance of such an ability is an IP firewall such
as NetFilter [3] or pf [10], which allow a system administrator to describe the kinds of IP packets
that should and should not be allowed passage. This may be a surprising entrant on the “need” list,
but it shouldn’t be: if decades of observing the security of communication protocols has taught us
anything, it is to expect the unexpected. Baking-in the ability to respond to vulnerability disclosures
by deploying a new policy rather than deploying an entirely new patched kernel makes defending
vulnerable systems infinitely more practical.
Given such a filtering policy, then, we need to enforce it. At some point in the parsing process,
the parser needs to compare the input data against the user policy and, if the policy matches, take
the prescribed action. (Filtering policies frequently are of the form “take such-and-such an action
if the input matches such-and-such a pattern”. Examples of policies written for the pf firewall are
shown in Figure 1.2.) The language used to specify user-defined policies should closely mirror the
underlying protocol so as to make both writing and understanding the policy easier for mere humans.
With these components in hand, one might think our task is done. It is not. In addition to being
able to parse data and enforce policy, we must be able to test the system. Without the ability to
test it, we can have little or no confidence in its correctness under benign circumstances, let alone
its behavior when targeted by evildoers. We need two specific tools to fulfill this need.
First, we need the ability to craft and inject arbitrary traffic into the parser. This task is
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somewhat complicated by the fact that these parsers are often going to be running inside the kernel.
Given that many of the data sources whose parsers need to be tested will be hardware-based (e.g.,
network interface controllers, USB devices, Thunderbolt devices), hardware might be required for
injection. Buying a bunch of USB devices from your local electronics store isn’t sufficient because
(ideally) those devices will attempt to conform to the protocol specification. We also need to create
and inject data that doesn’t conform to the specification and verify that the parser correctly rejects
it.
Second, we need to be able to monitor the behavior of the parser while it is performing its
task. That is, the ability to debug the parser should be built into itself. Once again our task is
complicated by the fact that this code will often be running inside the kernel: we must balance the
need for efficiency with the need for transparency. Fortunately, there exist systems that balance
these requirements quite well, which I describe later.
Thus, to summarize, we need:
• type definitions that represent protocol primitives (i.e., messages)—practically speaking, for
kernel code, these take the form of C structs;
• code to parse raw binary data into the aforementioned data structures (which must also rec-
ognize when raw binary data fails to conform to rules regarding well-formed messages within
the protocol, and reject it);
• a way for users to specify protocol-specific policy that is orthogonal to the syntactic correctness
of the protocol itself (i.e., firewall rules);
• a way to enforce this user-defined filtering policy (which requires knowing where in the afore-
mentioned code to place the hooks that enforce user-defined policy);
• a way to craft and inject arbitrary data, so as to test an implementation; and
• a way to observe the code as it handles the injected data, so as to locate and fix bugs—an
instrumentation framework that exposes control flow within affected subsystems of the kernel.
With these tools in our pocket, we can proceed with relative confidence that our parser is, if
not secure, at least rooted in principled development practices, flexible to unexpected needs, and
suited to debugging in the face of misbehavior. This claim is intentionally weak: why should anyone
believe the code I happen to write is any more secure than other code written by someone else? The
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Figure 1.3: Workflow of a DSL-based parser generator. Given a description of the protocol language
written in the domain-specific language, the parser generator produces the parser code.
Fortunately, besides the empirical evaluation against a suite of known vulnerability triggers, two
separate methods exist to instill confidence in the security of such code: automagic generation of
parsers (i.e., “parser generators”) and formal verification. I will discuss each of these in turn.
1.3 Automagic Generation
As shown above, parsers and related tools are an important part of the trusted computing base.
One strategy to improve security in general is to reduce the size of the trusted computing base such
that it’s feasible for a (small) set of people to manually audit. To that end, efforts have arisen
that attempt to minimize the amount of code related to parsers, many resulting in domain-specific
languages (DSLs) to describe protocols and parser generators to generate the actual parsing code.
The idea is that the DSL protocol description and the parser generator—which is essentially a
compiler from the DSL to, e.g., C—will individually be simple enough to audit. Figure 1.3 shows a
stylized rendition of this workflow.
A domain-specific language is, as the name implies, a language designed to address a particular
need. In contrast to general programming languages like C and Python, domain-specific languages
are much narrower in scope, with both smaller specifications and smaller compilers. Additionally,
domain-specific languages often need not be Turing-complete, which suggests that automating their
verification may be more tractable [62]. For the purposes of this dissertation, a domain-specific
language for protocol analysis provides a way to declaratively—as opposed to procedurally—describe
the messages and state machine(s) for a given protocol as well as a mechanism to translate that
description into executable code that parses messages of that protocol. In short, a language and a
compiler for it.
1.3.1 Prior Work: DSL-based Parser Generators
This dissertation is not the first to use a domain-specific language to generate parsers. The classic
example is yacc [34], which historically was used to generate parsers for programming language
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source code rather than messages in a wire protocol. Given a grammar describing the programming
language, yacc produces an LALR parser for that language, which can be augmented with code to
execute when particular rules are matched.
DSLs have also been used in the realm of more traditional communication protocols. In 1998,
Vern Paxson introduced the Bro [49] intrusion detection system (IDS), one of whose primary features
is a domain-specific language for describing TCP/IP traffic. Its intent was (and continues to be) to
run on a standalone machine on a network, examining all traffic for suspicious patterns. As such,
it is not integrated with the running kernel and it is optimized for applying a variety of acceptable
patterns to a given message rather than verifying the correctness of a single message in the context
of a single machine. (Bro was, incidentally, inspired by an observation similar to the one attributed
to Ptacek and Newsham in Section 1.1.).
More recently, GAPA [6] advertises itself as a “second-generation generic application-level pro-
tocol analyzer”. While its intention is slightly orthogonal to the task of parsing protocol traffic for
kernel consumption—it’s targeted at rapidly creating vulnerability signatures to incorporate into
userland intrusion-detection systems—GAPA has some lessons to teach. First, a quick, intuitive
description language is important to encourage adoption. Second, while they originally intended for
vulnerability detection, they realized that the ability to clearly and concisely describe protocol mes-
sages was useful in other areas, as well. They specifically mention tcpdump [33] and Wireshark [15]
(née Ethereal), but the lesson applies even further than they claim: why not use this power to
improve the kernel itself?
PADS [24] comes from the programming-languages research community rather than the systems
or security communities, but has much the same idea as the other projects described here, with one
significant difference: it is intended for parsing data that does not necessarily follow the strict rules
of a protocol specification. The authors found themselves needing to parse data that frequently
deviated from a normal, expected, easily-describable pattern, and therefore designed a DSL that
produced parsers that were resilient to these deviations. This desideratum lies in stark contrast
to the other systems described here, which exist precisely to ensure protocol traffic conforms to a
standard. I explore the significance of this shortly.
To round out our mini-survey, Packet Types [39] is perhaps the closest in spirit to my work. The
authors recognize that the task of parsing can be equated to the idea of testing whether a given
message is a valid member of a particular type, where a sufficiently descriptive specification of the
type can ensure the correctness of the message. Additionally, the authors draw explicit inspiration
from functional programming languages such as ML, which is similar to my work’s inspiration from
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Haskell. Packet Types, however, does not attempt to integrate with existing operating systems,
though they claim it would likely be possible.
Additional research that bears mention includes Shield [63] and binpac [47], both of which use
domain-specific languages to generate parsers for wire protocols. Their contributions are superseded
by the aforementioned tools, however.
The domain-specific languages and associated systems surveyed here, while not an exhaustive
list, are representative of the state of the art within the systems and security communities. They
do, however, have two significant shortcomings. First, all of the systems are intended to be run as
userland applications, independent of running kernels. In the case of an intrusion detection system,
this is not necessarily a fatal flaw (though defense in depth—i.e., validating protocol messages both
at a network-wide IDS and at each individual host—is a Good Thing). When considering protocols
like USB, however, in which devices are plugged directly into hosts, one cannot feasibly offload
protocol analysis to a separate machine.
The other drawback of these systems is that, while they all feature extensive testing, none of
them offer guarantees or proofs of correctness. Given the importance of parsers as described earlier,
this is an unfortunate omission. Ideally, parsers would be subject to formal verification (described
below, in Section 1.4). Before delving into that world, however, let us consider another way to
specify a domain-specific language, one that does not require inventing a brand new language.
1.3.2 Embedded DSLs
The aforementioned systems created DSLs and their associated compilers from scratch. An alterna-
tive is to use an existing, possibly general-purpose, language and its compiler to achieve the same
goal, enhancing and extending them as necessary. This approach is called an embedded domain-
specific language (eDSL), because the domain-specific features are grafted onto (i.e., embedded into)
another language and its compiler. Due to their already-declaratory form, functional programming
languages are especially popular bases for eDSLs. Additionally, given the observation above re-
garding the job of the parser being to annotate incoming data with eloquent type information, a
functional programming language that provides a rich type system is ideal. Both of these desiderata
scream for a Haskell-like language.
There exist many examples of embedded domain-specific languages, and many specifically using
Haskell. For instance, Parsec [37] is a library that provides a DSL for defining parser-combinators.
It differs from the work in this thesis in that it attempts to be a general-purpose parsing engine, and
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it does not produce code that can be natively integrated into a production kernel. Diagrams [23] is
a Haskell-based eDSL for creating vector graphics.
Wang used Haskell as the basis of her Protege system [64, 66], which is similar to the work
in this thesis in that it embeds a domain-specific language for describing networking protocols and
generates parser code from. It differs, however, in that its primary target is embedded (i.e., hardware)
systems, it does not attempt to support user-written policies or injection, and it does not make any
claims about correctness beyond those derived from being an eDSL-based system. Furthermore,
the protocol used in Protege’s proof of concept—Modbus—is an entirely different domain to the
protocol I used for my proof of concept: USB. That said, my work does not handle layering and
encapsulation, and can take inspiration from Protege’s implementation of same.
The hypothesis, then, is that we could embed a parser-generator DSL in Haskell to produce the
various code artifacts described in Section 1.2. Therefore, to audit our system, we need only review
the DSL description of the protocol in question and the Haskell code that “compiles” the DSL to
C. We will have thus reduced the size of the trusted computing base, made the job of auditing the
code involved in our parser much more tractable, and hence emerge with much more confidence in
the security of our parser.
This is a significant win, but we can go one step further.
1.4 Formal Verification & Complete Mediation
For many years, the systems and security research communities have been using domain-specific
languages (DSLs) to produce protocol parsers for use in operating system kernels, firewalls, and
intrusion detection systems [6, 65, 24, 39]. These systems reduce the trusted computing base (TCB)
of protocol parsers in the sense that, if one trusts the parser generator to behave as it claims, one
need only ensure the correctness of the more-concise DSL description of the protocol. If one trusts
the parser generator to behave as it claims. Casting no aspersions whatsoever on its authors, one
would be remiss in tacitly trusting in the correctness of any software without formal proof to that
effect.
Such proofs are the purview of the software verification community, which generally has a repu-
tation for avoiding low-level systems code. The NICTA group in Australia recently demonstrated,
however, the feasibility of producing a fully functional, fully verified, fully performant operating sys-
tem kernel, l4.verified [35]. This project used a combination of hand-written Haskell, hand-written
C, and hand-written proofs for the Isabelle proof-checking environment to verify security properties
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of the resultant kernel. Other researchers in the verification community have also turned their at-
tention to low-level code (as evidenced by, e.g., RockSalt [42] and Idris [7]), but it is far from the
norm.
Therefore, on the one hand we have domain-specific languages feeding parser generators to ease
the creation of parsers and on the other we have mechanisms to prove the correctness of low-level
systems code. It is the concerted opinion of this author that these two worlds should merge. To
that end, this dissertation presents a domain-specific language for describing protocols, one whose
compiler produces not only the code to parse the described protocol, but also the model to facilitate
verifying the correctness of the code produced.
Beyond verifying that the parser correctly parses protocol messages, we must also make sure
that every message received by the system is evaluated by the parser. This is the notion of complete
mediation and is distinct from formal verification in that the latter can only make claims about how
it processes the messages it actually sees. Both static and dynamic analysis can be used to ensure
a system exhibits complete mediation; I survey some of those now.
Static analysis is a technique in which inert code (source code or compiled machine code) is
examined for runtime properties—in this case, complete mediation. Zhang et al [67] used CQUAL
to determine whether the hooks provided by the Linux Security Modules framework really guard
every avenue by which certain vital kernel data structures are accessed. CMV [56] uses static analysis
to verify that Java bytecode programs exhibit complete mediation relative to system-level resources
provided by the Java Virtual Machine.
In the realm of dynamic analysis, which analyzes running programs, Klee [12] uses symbolic
execution to explore possible execution paths of a program. Given that it tests exhaustively by
design, Klee is guaranteed to test for complete mediation, though its scaling properties leave much
to be desired. Though admittedly less comprehensive, an empirical method to determine whether a
system exhibits complete mediation is to instrument the system with hooks at the important places,
send a great deal of crafted data at the system, and verify that the hooks intercept all the data.
Any demonstrable example of an input bypassing the hooks would disprove complete mediation;
of course, lack of such examples is heartening though not conclusive. This is the purview of fuzz-
testing, which has been widely adopted by the software industry as a means of vulnerability testing.
As I said, this is less comprehensive, but it can be easier to execute and its merits are apparent in
the broad adoption of fuzzing techniques for exploring system security.
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1.5 Practical Matters
The preceding sections outline a number of desired security properties for parsers (and, more gen-
erally, protocol stacks): specific technical artifacts whose code is both automagically generated and
amenable to formal verification. The primary contribution of this dissertation is conclusive evidence
that these are feasible in the context of a production-level operating system. In the following chap-
ters, I describe the parser construction methodology and the various technical artifacts united by
this methodology that I have produced to this end. But first, a brief description of the protocol I
chose for my case study (USB) and the operating system with which I chose to integrate (FreeBSD).
1.5.1 Universal Serial Bus
Most security research involving parsing focusses on traditional networking interfaces such as Ether-
net and TCP/IP. The Universal Serial Bus (USB), which most users take for granted as being used
for keyboards, mice, and thumbdrives, was similarly taken more or less for granted by the security
community—until about 2010 when our and other researchers’ results demonstrated that vulnera-
bilities in USB implementations could be easily and effectively developed [8, 22, 17, 38]. The code
that implements the USB protocol runs with the same kernel privileges as the code that implements
TCP/IP, although exploitation in the case of USB requires physical access.
Not just that, but the very “universal” nature of USB makes it inherently more difficult to secure:
the protocol is explicitly intended to support arbitrary devices. Like the TCP/IP stack, then, the
USB protocol is layered such that arbitrary application-level protocols can be transmitted over the
USB. The scary difference between the two, however, is that the host-side code that handles the
application-level protocol runs within the kernel.
Therefore, a new kernel device driver is required to support a new USB device. Not only do
device drivers run within the kernel (and hence with full kernel privileges) but they happen to
exhibit surprisingly high vulnerability rates [14]. The large variety of USB devices induces the
creation of a large variety of associated device drivers. It is highly unlikely that these drivers have
all received the same degree of exercise (and, by extension, auditing) as, for example, the USB
keyboard driver. It is thus imprudent to believe that the collection of USB device drivers that ship
with a given kernel is free of vulnerabilities. This is unfortunate, but not necessarily fatal: how many
instances of obscure devices actually exist that can take advantage of these potentially-vulnerable
drivers? It turns out not to matter.
The USB protocol begins with a process called enumeration, in which the host queries the device
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for its identity, so that the host can associate the correct application-level device driver with it.
With a customized device, an attacker can tweak the enumeration process to identify itself as any
arbitrary device and thus pick precisely which device driver within the kernel to communicate with.
An attacker would presumably target a driver with a known vulnerability; a defender would want to
explore the behavior of drivers with potential vulnerabilities. The data structures exchanged during
enumeration are complex and must be parsed; this is a known source of vulnerabilities [20].
To the best of my knowledge, very little effort has been expended to secure USB. In discussing
this seeming deficit with employees of Microsoft who work in this area, the prevailing notion is that
USB is limited to local attacks and are thus worth less attention than remote attacks to which, e.g.,
the TCP/IP stack is exposed. While this is true, it undersells the insidiousness of USB as an attack
surface. An attacker can walk up to a powered-off machine, turn it on, stick in a USB device, and
immediately have a direct line to the kernel in the form of USB device enumeration.
Two anecdotes provide compelling evidence to support the claim that USB is worth attention.
First: Stuxnet, the malware used to compromise the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz. Following
sound network defense principles, the uranium enrichment centrifuges were on a physically separate
network from the outside world. That is, an airgap prevented attacks originating on the Internet from
affecting the machines performing the uranium enrichment. Despite this, those protected machines
were compromised; experts are convinced that USB was the vector by which those machines were
infected [36]. Someone plugged a USB device into a machine that was otherwise protected by the
airgap and the infection spread from there.
Second: in March 2013, Microsoft issued a patch for Windows that “could allow elevation of
privilege if an attacker gains access to a system” [19]. CERT is more forthcoming in their description:
“The USB kernel-mode drivers in [many versions of Windows] do not properly handle objects in
memory, which allows physically proximate attackers to execute arbitrary code by connecting a
crafted USB device” [13]. The disclosure goes on to discuss that the vulnerability exists in the code
that handles device enumeration.
These anecdotes are not intended as criticisms of any party involved. Rather, they are evi-
dence that USB is generally underappreciated as an attack vector and hence merits attention. The
tools to deliver such attacks are not figments of our imagination: various USB hacking tools use
the Teensy [61] development board to deliver scripted exploitative payloads via USB. A versatile
open-hardware platform, USB Armory [4] far supersedes these capabilities, adding a full-featured
microprocessor behind a USB interface.
More generally, USB is representative of line-oriented protocols (e.g., transport protocols such
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as Thunderbolt and Fibre Channel; disk protocols such as SCSI) and thus the system I have imple-
mented provides a model for how those protocols might be implemented more securely, as well.
1.5.2 FreeBSD
I chose FreeBSD [51] as the kernel whose USB stack to augment with the aforementioned tools.
FreeBSD is a widely-deployed, high-performance kernel in the UNIX tradition, with a well-deserved
reputation for clean, understandable code and carefully-architected subsystems. Integrating with
FreeBSD demonstrates the viability of my approach in the context of a production-quality kernel
(i.e., not just an academic toy).
1.6 Summary of Contributions
Thus far, I described the irreplaceable role protocols play in modern computing systems and the role
parsers play in their implementation. I introduced the idea of using domain-specific languages to
generate parsers, with the goal of reducing the trusted computing base to the DSL specification of
the protocol and the DSL compiler. I contrasted the DSL approach with that of formal verification
and argued that the two can (and should) be considered complementary strategies to producing
trustworthy parsers.
In light of this, the contributions of this dissertation are as follows.
I developed a methodology for designing and implementing secure parsers and successfully applied
it to the USB protocol in a production kernel. I empirically demonstrated that the case-study
implementation is stable, effective in mediating malicious and non-standard inputs, and applied
an industry-standard test suite to it. Due to their method of construction—autogeneration from
type definitions of protocol messages and their elements—my USB parser/firewall is amenable to the
same kind of automated verification that produced the fully formally-verified seL4 microkernel. I do,
however, relegate such verification to future work as that effort is beyond the scope of a one-person
project.
These contributions are presented in this dissertation as follows. First, I present (above) a
detailed checklist of the components that ought to be implemented when supporting a new protocol
(Section 1.2). Second, I present the tools I wrote to fulfill the needs of USB injection (Chapter 3) and
inspection of a running USB stack (Chapter 4). Third, I present a case study I performed wherein I
automagically generated a front-end parser for the USB protocol and integrated it with FreeBSD’s
production USB stack (Chapter 5). Finally, I empirically evaluate the security and performance of
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my implementation using an industry-standard USB test suite (Chapter 6), demonstrating that it
succeeded on all tests. In each chapter, I suggest by whom and where in the process of implementing
a protocol the steps described therein should be performed.
In short, I demonstrate that it is feasible to construct parser generators whose products parse
real-world protocols, are amenable to machine verification, integrate cleanly with existing operating
systems, and are sufficiently performant to make a compelling case for their use. My study demon-
strates that a similar approach can and therefore should be used in all security-critical systems.
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Chapter 2
Overview of USB: Protocol and
Vulnerabilities
This chapter provides an introduction to the USB protocol from the perspective of someone wishing
to explore the attack surface presented by a host with working USB ports. Following the description
of the protocol itself, I review the most comprehensive study to date of USB vulnerabilities, produced
by the NCC Group in 2013 [20], which includes a classification of vulnerability types. Then I examine
all USB-related vulnerabilities reported in the National Vulnerability Database [59] and attempt to
place these vulnerabilities in the classification scheme proposed by the NCC work. The ultimate
intention is, in later chapters, to show how the USB parser/firewall I produced can guard against
these classes.
2.1 The Protocol
When a USB device is plugged into a host, the operating system running on that host communicates
with it by sending requests and receiving responses. In the majority of circumstances, all communi-
cation is initiated by the host in the form of polling. (Low-level timing considerations are handled
directly in the USB controller hardware and are below the level of abstraction I focus on in this
work.)
When a device is initially plugged in, the host must query it to determine its nature—whether
it is, e.g., a keyboard, a mouse, a MIDI device, or a printer. This initial conversation between host
and device is referred to as enumeration and happens for every device. In addition to determining
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Host: 80 06 00 01 00 00 12 00
Device: 12 01 00 02 00 00 00 40 1E 04 02 04 00 01 01 02 03 01
Figure 2.1: A request from the host for the first 18 bytes of the device descriptor (id 1, byte 4) and
the device’s response.
characteristics of the device such as polling frequency, preferred data transfer size, and power re-
quirements, the host will also decide which kernel device driver to associate with the device when
enumeration is complete. The communication channel that carries the enumeration messages is
separate from application-level communication channels and is retained throughout the connected
lifetime of the device. Once enumeration has finished, however, the associated device driver controls
its own communication channels (called endpoints) to and from the device.
Note that this gives the device significant leverage over the operating system: it gets to pick and
choose precisely which driver to handle its application-level data. In essence, data sent by the device
determines the code paths and control flows that handle data sent henceforth. If an old, poorly
maintained, buggy (i.e., vulnerable) driver is still shipped with an operating system, one could use
a custom USB hardware device to select it during the enumeration process and exploit it.
Note also that plugging a USB device into the machine gives an immediate communication
channel direct to the kernel. Even following enumeration, most application-level USB drivers still
run in kernel mode (though this is changing: see Microsoft’s User Mode Driver Framework [18]) as
well. Despite the direct line to the soft, defenseless innards of the operating system, I know of no
framework—prior to mine presented here—that defends against attacks by this vector.
Returning to enumeration, most of the messages that comprise this process are descriptors that
contain various parameters of the device in question. Figure 2.1 shows a request for a descriptor
sent from the host to a device and the response containing the descriptor itself. In this example, the
fourth byte of the host’s requests identifies the descriptor being requested (in this case, the “device”
descriptor) and the seventh byte indicates the amount of data the host would like to receive back
(in this case, 0x12 = 18 bytes).
Then, in the response, the first byte indicates the total number of bytes sent by the device.
This presents a classic opportunity for an exploitable bug. If the host does not verify that the
received data is in fact 18 bytes long (in this case), then the host runs the risk of either underflowing
or overflowing a kernel buffer. (The infamous Heartbleed [46] vulnerability is an example of an
underflowed buffer and overflowed buffer examples are legion [45, 53].)
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My work in this thesis focusses entirely on the enumeration phase of the USB protocol. Some
might consider that limiting but, as we will see, this phase can harbor a surprisingly large number
of bugs.
2.2 USB As a Gateway to the Kernel
The previous section covers enumeration but not application-level protocols. Given that the nature
of USB enables a device to pick and choose precisely which driver within the kernel to exchange
application-level data with, this is a notable omission. Allow me to address that.
Like the TCP/IP family of networking protocols, USB is layered : it allows data from one protocol
to be encapsulated inside another. This is, in fact, precisely how USB supports such a wide variety
of devices: once enumeration is complete, the active part of the USB protocol steps aside and mostly
just ensures the delivery of application-level data between a collection of host and device endpoints
through codepaths designated during enumeration. Since many USB devices implement application-
level protocols that have been natively implemented in past (e.g., SCSI, audio, keyboards) this often
provides a direct codepath to parts of the kernel outside the USB stack itself.
The work we presented at the Workshop on Embedded System Security in 2012 [8] explored the
reachability of kernel logic from the USB interface with a focus on the storage subsystem, down
to the granularity of basic blocks. We found that a USB device could access essentially the entire
FreeBSD storage subsystem, which is particularly notable because so many other aspects of the
system depend on disks. Furthermore, this is only the storage subsystem. We conjectured that
our results could extrapolate to the many subsystems in the kernel proper likely touched by USB
devices, including printing, networking, and human-interface devices.
Therefore, the fact that so many codepaths in the kernel are accessible via USB only increases
the importance of correctly parsing the data that arrives from untrusted devices. It is a crucial
boundary to ensuring the security of running systems.
2.3 Vulnerabilities
In 2013, Andy Davis of the NCC Group wrote a test suite, umap, to comprehensively explore the
behavior of operating systems in the face of unexpected input received during USB enumeration. He
published his results in an aptly-named technical report, Lessons learned from 50 bugs: Common
USB driver vulnerabilities [20], which I summarize here. It should be noted that umap builds on the
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injection framework I constructed as preparatory work for this thesis, which I describe in Chapter 3.
Thus, my initial work on this thesis enabled the creation of an industry-standard security testing
suite.
Using special-purpose hardware driven by Python scripts, he emulated a variety of USB devices
being plugged into a target host and controlled every aspect of the data sent from these devices to the
host during each enumeration phase. His scripts caused the emulated devices to send intentionally
malformed data to the host while he observed how the host responded—a crash indicated that the
host does not correctly handle the malformed data. He tested a large variety of malformations and
produced the following ontology of bugs.
Unspecified Denial of Service, in which the driver or host machine usually crashes, but
not in a way that is exploitable by an attacker. This class includes null-pointer dereferences and
out-of-bounds reads. Davis does not consider these security-related bugs in the context of USB
drivers.
Buffer overflows, in which bounds are not adequately checked prior to memory operations.
As an example, Davis described a Linux driver that allocates 80 bytes for the contents of a string
descriptor; but the string descriptor can be up to 252 bytes long. Thus, when a string descriptor
longer than 80 bytes arrives, the remaining data overwrites other kernel memory, which is certainly
a bug and quite possibly exploitable.
Integer overflows and other length-related bugs, in which arithmetic performed on num-
bers provided by the device can lead to unintentional memory allocations. Consider the bug described
in the previous paragraph: the logical solution would be to read in the length of the descriptor (an
8-bit value), allocate the appropriate amount of memory, and then copy the string into that memory.
If, however, any arithmetic is performed on the length, an attacker could cause the length to overflow
past 255 and cause less memory than necessary to be allocated. Then, when the string is copied,
it could again overwrite existing data structures. Davis identifies instances of this happening in
hub descriptors, configuration descriptors, endpoint descriptors, HID descriptors, image class data
transfers, and printer class data transfers.
Format string bugs, in which user-controlled input is used as the format string in calls to the
printf family of functions. Historically, this allowed an attacker to write to arbitrary locations in
memory using the “%n” format specifier. While this specifier has been widely deprecated, many
compilers still support it. (In fact, Kees Cook demonstrated just such an attack using a custom
USB device in 2012 [17].)
Logic errors, in which the operating system incorrectly handles a given input. As Davis points
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out, these are implementation-specific because the logic of driver code often varies greatly between
operating systems. Some such logic error result in memory corruption when an 8-bit field is set
to 0xFF, where the protocol specification only expects values between 0 and 127. In this case, the
operating system is incorrectly handling unexpected input.
2.3.1 National Vulnerability Database (CVEs)
A kind of “ground truth” of vulnerabilities in deployed software is captured in the National Vul-
nerability Database. Vulnerability disclosures, dubbed “CVEs” (Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures), are reported and assigned on the basis of particular products and technologies found to
be vulnerable. The CVE system does not attempt to classify vulnerabilities. Recently, an attempt
to provide an ontology of the underlying causes for CVEs has been made in the form of the Com-
mon Weakness Enumeration (CWE) system [58]. For our purposes, however, the NCC classification
described above is more suitable, being targeted specifically to USB.
Between January 2005 and December 2015, exactly 100 of the vulnerabilities reported to the
NVD contained the string “usb”. I surveyed all 100 of these vulnerabilities and placed each in one
of the five categories identified by Davis. I use the result of this survey 1 in Chapter 6 to gauge the
effectiveness of the USB firewall I created based on the distribution of bugs between classes. Not
surprisingly, the bugs mitigated by proper parsing form a significant subset.
2.4 Realization
While a world in which every protocol designer, implementer, and user is intimately aware of both
the details of the protocol and existing bugs in various implementations would be fantastic in the
sense of being wonderful, it is also fantastic in the sense of being unrealistic. At the very least,
however, the designer and implementer (both client- and host-side) should have such knowledge.
Additionally, implementation maintainers should remain abreast of security disclosures relative to
the implementations they administer.




“Security won’t get better until tools for practical exploration of the attack surface are
made available.” (Joshua Wright, 2011) [28]
The first piece of my research plan was a framework for injecting arbitrary, crafted frames into
USB.
Despite the security benefits promised by formal verification, the ability to empirically evaluate
the security of deployed system remains vital; this ability rests on being able to craft and inject arbi-
trary traffic. For starters, no fully-verified systems have been deployed in any meaningful quantity.
Additionally, an enormous number of unverified systems exist in the wild whose security we need to
be able to analyze.
Additionally, the benefits espoused by the formal verification community are, perhaps, not as
widely-applicable as we might like to think. To see why, consider that formal verification attempts to
prove that certain properties of code are maintained (e.g., that execution proceeds linearly from in-
struction to instruction except in the case of explicit, intended branches). These statement of formal
correctness are only useful if we are able to completely enumerate all relevant security properties.
For the most generic software models, the task may, in fact, be impossible [54].
As a side-note, symbolic execution is a complementary approach to formal verification that
attempts to explore how a system behaves in the face of all possible inputs. The state of the art in
this area, Klee [12], is effective for a wide variety of software, but it suffers from scalability issues
due to the massive state-space explosion incurred by branch-heavy code [11].
Due to these concerns, many security practitioners feel that we cannot trust the security of large-
scale systems without thorough probing of their attack surface. This notion is embodied by the quote
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Figure 3.1: The Facedancer board (version 10).
above, sometimes referred to as Wright’s Principle. This dissertation accepts this assertion: namely,
that the ability to inject arbitrary data into that system is crucial. While commercial solutions to
inject arbitrary bits onto a USB exist (e.g., MQP Packet-Master USB-500 [43]), it was not until
Travis Goodspeed produced the Facedancer [27] that this capability was accessible to a widespread
audience.
3.1 Facedancer
The Facedancer platform—the board designed by Travis Goodspeed in collaboration with Sergey
Bratus, with software contributed by me—is a custom PCB based on the GoodFET, a general-
purpose, open-source JTAG adapter. As seen in Figure 3.1, it connects to both a host and a target
(victim). The host sees the connected Facedancer as a standard USB FDDI (serial) device which
can be controlled using a simple datagram-based protocol, whereas the target sees whatever USB
device the host chooses to emulate.
This emulation is driven by commands received by the Facedancer over the serial line. A ded-
icated FDDI chip passes commands received on to the Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller
that serves as the main computational brains of the board and speaks the generic GoodFET serial
protocol. Commands that request sending or receiving USB frames to or from the target are passed
over an SPI bus to the MAX3421 USB controller chip [31], which is connected to the target-facing
USB type-A port.
The MAX3421 handles much of the low-level, time-sensitive aspects of the USB protocol—for
instance, responding with NAKs while the host-side code is composing a response to a request sent
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Figure 3.2: The USB hierarchy as implemented in the host-side Facedancer stack. This figure de-
scribes a single USB device that supports two distinct configurations, the first consisting of two
interfaces, each with two endpoints, and the second consisting of a single interface with three end-
points.
focus on the content of its responses rather than, e.g., timing issues on the bus.
3.2 Host-side Software
The Facedancer comes with a host-side Python library for emulating USB devices. As such projects
are wont to do, however, it evolved to meet the needs of debugging in-development hardware until the
hardware platform stabilized. The original code was thus poorly organized and poorly documented.
Furthermore, it did not reflect the structure of the USB protocol: in short, it was difficult to adapt
to arbitrary uses, which was the main purpose of the project to begin with. Therefore, I wrote a
brand-new host-side software stack for the Facedancer from scratch.
3.2.1 USB Component Hierarchy
My code follows the USB hierarchy of concepts with the intention that it be easier to understand and
modify. An example instance of this hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.2. This hierarchy captures the
notion that a single, physical USB device may have multiple configurations (i.e., sets of interfaces it
may present to a host), each of which may have multiple interfaces, each of which may have multiple
endpoints. These terms follow the established USB vocabulary.
Perhaps confusingly, the interface—in USB terminology—is what encapsulates the functionality
of, e.g., a mouse or a keyboard. The notion of a device, on the other hand, is the physically-connected
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object, which may present itself to a host as multiple logical devices. (Think of a USB keyboard
with a trackpad: it connects to the host via a single cable, but the host recognizes it as two logical
devices—a keyboard and a mouse. In this example, the thing that plugs in is a device whereas
the keyboard and mouse are interfaces.) The operating-system implication of this division is that
separate interfaces on a single (USB) device may be associated with different (kernel) device drivers.
This separation has been used by a number of production designs, such as SanDisk’s U3 technology
and related DRM schemes.
In USB, endpoints are channels of communication, somewhat analogous to ports in TCP and
UDP. (For additional analogies between USB and TCP/IP concepts, see Table 3.1, duplicated from
our WESS paper [8]; further details may be found there.) They allow multiplexing communication
over the single USB cable. Their primary use is to segregate device-level control messages from
application data; the former uses endpoint 0 whereas the latter may use one or more of the remaining
255 interface-specific endpoints.
3.2.2 Enumeration
When a USB device is first connected to a host, the host and device carry out a process called
enumeration, in which the former interrogates the latter as to its capabilites. This conversation
consists of descriptors sent from the device to the host which describe all aspects of its behavior:
configurations, interfaces, endpoints, strings, etc.
My code cleanly delineates between the logic that implements enumeration and that which im-
plements application-level control. As such, it is easy to customize specific aspects of the emulated
device. Instead of the raw bit-banging typical in prototypes, the new stack cleanly delineates the
various functionality in a class hierarchy that mirrors the hierarchy of USB itself. Therefore, to
customize aspects of a particular endpoint, one need only focus on the USBEndpoint instance that
implements the functionality in question.
This is not to say that the new stack doesn’t support bit-banging! A combination of callback
functions and member variables allows arbitrary code to handle any aspect of the emulated-device-
to-host communication, so a potential fuzz-tester is welcome to override the default functionality in
any way he or she sees fit. One benefit of the class structure mirroring the structure of the USB
protocol, however, is that finding the code to override is much easier. Instead of having to dig
through code that manually assembles hard-coded binary strings to find where the configuration
descriptor is created, one need only override the get descriptor method of the USBConfiguration
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Table 3.1: Analogous features between Ethernet networks—which we have much experience
securing—and USB infrastructure. (Reproduced from the paper that presented this work at the
Workshop on Embedded Systems Security [8].)
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class.
As a result, creating a new emulated device or modifying an existing one is quicker, simpler, and
more intuitive. It was gratifying to find this code become the basis for the industry-standard test
suite, umap.
3.3 Reference Emulations
Using the library described in the previous section, I implemented programs that emulate a USB
keyboard, a USB mass storage device, and a USB FTDI (serial) device.
For each, I created a new class that derived from the USBInterface class, in which I defined
the static parameters of the device (e.g., number and type of endpoints, manufacturer and product
strings). When this class is instantiated, the library code takes care of marshalling and sending the
various descriptors during USB enumeration: no customization of device initialization is necessary.
It just works.
Once enumeration is complete, the emulated device will need to handle incoming requests
from the target machine. These requests are handled entirely by a single function within the
USBInterface class. Therefore, to customize the behavior of the emulated device, one need only
customize this particular function. Thus, the author of an emulated USB device is insulated from
the complication of the USB protocol itself and is left to focus on the device-level protocol. (To wit:
the source file that implements the USB FTDI device, USBFtdi.py, is entirely composed of code
that deals with serial requests. The only USB-specific parts are those that define parameters of the
device to be sent during the enumeration phase.)
This design benefits a programmer seeking to implement a well-behaving device as well as one
seeking to implement a misbehaving device, for the purpose of probing the security of a host’s USB
stack. In this case, the programmer need only derive a new instance of the class which contains
the functionality he wishes to customize and override the appropriate function. For instance, if a
programmer wanted to explore how a host handles malformed configuration descriptors, he or she
would derive from USBConfiguration and override the get descriptor function of his new class.
Then, when the target machine asks the emulated device for its configuration descriptor, it is sent
a descriptor produced by the customzed code rather than the default, well-formed descriptor.
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3.4 Code
All of the code described in this chapter is available in the public GoodFET repository on github:
https://github.com/travisgoodspeed/goodfet, under the “client” subdirectory.
The library code described in Section 3.2 is in the USB*.py files.
Code that implements the logic of emulated devices described in Section 3.3 is in USBKeyboard.py,
USBFtdi.py, and USBMassStorage.py.
Executables to run these emulated devices are in the facedancer-*.py files.
3.5 Realization
As illustrated by the quote that opens this chapter, the ability to craft and inject arbitrary traffic
is vital to producing implementations whose security we can trust. All implementations, therefore,
should be tested with such tools. Fortunately, because injection may (and likely should) happen
external to the protocol implementation itself, injection tools can be developed separately from, e.g.,
operating system kernels and client hardware.
The most appropriate point in the protocol development pipeline where injection tools could
be implemented is in parallel with an operating-system agnostic reference implementation, which is
usually produced by the group developing the protocol itself. Failing that, unfortunately, there is
no single, obvious party, which is why we have seen the independent security community taking the




This chapter describes the instrumentation framework I designed, built, and applied to the USB
subsystem of the FreeBSD kernel. This framework had two goals: both to understand the existing
structure of the USB stack and to evaluate the effectiveness of my parser/firewall. The former goal
was interesting in its own right, but more importantly, it provided the insight necessary to integrate
my USB parser/firewall with FreeBSD’s USB stack. The latter was necessary for demonstrating the
efficacy of my implementation.
Injecting custom-crafted data, as described in the previous chapter, is vital for exploring the
security of systems. It does not, however, directly allow for the improvement of those systems
because the feedback is usually not sufficiently specific to inform debugging, vulnerability mitigation,
or vulnerability development efforts. A systems engineer needs to know precisely which code handles
the data and how so that when crafted data causes runtime errors, the offending code can be found
and fixed.
Mitigation plays an important practical role in operational security: specifically, in addition to
fixing bugs—which a user might wish to protect against before the vendor ships a fixing patch—one
might wish to implement user-defined policies on data flowing through the kernel. (Note that this
is separate from but complementary to checking that data flowing through the kernel conforms to
the protocol specification. As an example, one might wish to implement a policy that allows only
HID devices like mice and keyboards to be connected via USB.) Where in the flow of data through
the kernel should such policies be enforced? More specifically, where in the source code should
enforcement hooks be placed?
The DTRACE [57] system available on FreeBSD and Solaris pioneered the very sort of fine-
27
grained observation of live systems that would achieve this goal. (SystemTap on Linux was inspired
by DTRACE and fulfills a similar need.)
Unfortunately, even though DTRACE provides more insight into running systems, and with more
granularity, than has previously been available, it didn’t provide all the information necessary to
guide debugging and enforcement efforts. Specifically, its Function Boundary Testing probes were
unreliable; not only that, but they only fired when a function was called or returned: they did not
communicate the flow of control within a function. When considering kernel functions that may be
hundreds of lines long, this is a significant gap in observation.
Therefore, I implemented a set of custom, static DTRACE probes for FreeBSD that trace ex-
ecution within its USB stack at the basic-block level. Additionally, I implemented a set of scripts
that visualize these traces, showing the interaction between components of FreeBSD’s USB stack,
at the level of both functions and source files. These tools have a number of benefits: they provide
a heretofore-unavailable view of control flow within the kernel, they help readers of the kernel code
understand how the various components fit together (which can be useful to both kernel newbies
and grizzled veterans alike), and they guide the placement of policy-enforcement hooks such that
they can be most effective.
This work was presented at the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security in 2012 [8] and is
summarized below.
4.1 Instrumentation
DTRACE is an instrumentation framework for monitoring running FreeBSD and Solaris systems.
As such, it provides a large number of built-in probes that report on everything from system call
invocations to disk I/O patterns to system clock behavior. They do not, however, include probes
that let us trace the execution of kernel code at the basic-block level, which is necessary for the
debugging and hook-placement tasks described above.
Fortunately, DTRACE allows one to create custom sets of probes: thus, I created the usb bb
probeset and defined the following probes within it:
• MY FUNC ENTER(filename, function name) at the beginning of every function.







printf("%s/%s (%d) %s %s %s %d\n", curthread->td_proc->p_comm,
curthread->td_name, curthread->td_tid, probemod, probefunc,
probename, arg0);
}
Figure 4.1: Example script, written in D, that enables custom DTRACE probes MY BB ENTER and
MY BB RETURN; prints a message when execution reaches any of those points.
• MY BB START(filename, function name, index) at the beginning of every basic block, where
index uniquely identifies each basic block within the function.
• MY BB FINISH(filename, function name, index) at the end of every basic block, where
index matches the identifier of the associated MY BB START probe point.
• MY MUX(filename, label) at every point where a control-flow decision is made based on an
input value—in practice, this ended up being mostly function-pointer calls.
I manually added these probes to a local copy of the FreeBSD kernel source code. Table 4.1
summarizes the extent of these modifications within its USB stack.
probe qty event
MY FUNC ENTER(file, func) 204 upon function entry
MY FUNC RETURN(file, func) 356 upon function exit
MY BB START(file, func, n) 1235 upon starting basic block n in a given function
MY BB FINISH(file, func, n) 1235 upon finishing basic block n
MY MUX(label) 30 immediately prior to invocation of a callback
Table 4.1: Summary of static probes in our instrumentation framework.
Once these probes are placed in the kernel, they are quiescent until activated by a script writ-
ten in a special-purpose language called D. For example, the program in Figure 4.1 activates the
MY BB ENTER and MY BB RETURN probes and prints a message when execution reaches any of them.
When this script is run from the shell (with root privileges), it prints out one line per probe encoun-
tered and exits when the user presses Control-C.
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In the course of my instrumentation, I implemented many D scripts; descriptions of the notable
scripts follow.
• bb-count.d counts the number of times each instrumented basic-block executes.
• bb-trace.d prints a properly-indented message when a basic block is entered or left.
• mux-trace.d prints a message when a mux-point is reached, indicating the value of the data
that caused the choice of subsequent execution path.
• cam-trace.d traces the execution of storage subsystem operations within the USB stack. I
used this to help understand the structure and behavior of interactions between the generic
FreeBSD disk layer and the USB mass storage device driver. (CAM stands for Common Access
Method, a FreeBSD abstraction for interfacing with storage devices.)
Of these, the most interesting is bb-trace.d. Running it while performing USB-related ac-
tivities results in a guide to how those activites are processed within the kernel. Figure 4.2
shows an example output. This output begins with a call to usb callback proc in kernel thread
100036. In the zeroth basic block of that function, usb command wrapper is called, which sees ex-
ecution of its zeroth, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth basic blocks. This pattern continues
until umass t bbb command callback calls usbd xfer softc which immediately returns, followed
by a call to usbd xfer state which also immediately returns. Upon returning, execution within
umass t bbb command callback resumes in the second basic block.
This record can be related back to the actual instrumented source code, thus allowing the observer
to follow along in (somewhat) real time. Note that following along at this level of granularity is not
possible with the default set of DTRACE probes on FreeBSD (and even the function-level granularity
provided by the FBT probes is unreliable).
While undoubtedly interesting, the raw output of, e.g., bb-trace.d is less immediately useful.
I wrote a collection of Python, awk, and shell scripts to process this raw data into a more useful
format. (Another benefit to post-processing is to reduce the number of cycles required to process
probes firing in real-time: adding more intelligence to the D scripts causes probes to be dropped.)
The most interesting of these scripts is indent-bb-trace.py, which takes as input a basic-block
trace such as the one shown in Figure 4.2 and produces an indented trace as shown in Figure 4.3.
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100036 usb_callback_proc enter 0
100036 usb_command_wrapper enter 0 3 4 5 6 8
100036 usbd_callback_wrapper enter 0 4 5 13
100036 umass_t_bbb_command_callback enter 0
100036 usbd_xfer_softc enter 0
100036 usbd_xfer_softc return
100036 usbd_xfer_state enter 0
100036 usbd_xfer_state return
100036 umass_t_bbb_command_callback in 2 3
100036 usbd_xfer_get_frame enter 0
100036 usbd_xfer_get_frame return
100036 usbd_copy_in enter 0 1
100036 usbd_get_page enter 0 1 2 3 6
100036 usbd_get_page return
100036 usbd_copy_in in 2 3
100036 usbd_copy_in return
Figure 4.2: Output from the bb-trace.d DTRACE script, showing the basic blocks executed in
each function.
-> usb_callback_proc 0
-> usb_command_wrapper 0 3 4 5 6 8






-> usbd_copy_in 0 1
-> usbd_get_page 0 1 2 3 6
usbd_copy_in 2 3
<- usbd_copy_in
Figure 4.3: Indented basic-block trace. (The underlying data is the same as in Figure 4.2.)
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4.2 Experimental Results
My enhancement of the FreeBSD DTRACE dynamic probe system allows the user to formulate and
test hypotheses regarding reachability of specific parts of code—down to the granularity of basic
blocks—by specific USB inputs. To the best of my knowledge, this granularity has previously only
been available in static analysis tools such as IDA Pro [29], which are unsuitable for analysis of
running systems. The fine-grained instrumentation described in the previous section provides a
great deal of insight into the code being executed inside the kernel. What can we do with this
insight?
4.2.1 Measuring Code Coverage
While testing code thoroughly is a worthy goal, all too frequently code is shipped that has not
undergone sufficiently rigorous examination. When deployed, many pieces of software are implicitly
tested by users interacting with their systems performing everyday tasks. In the best-case scenario,
upon discovering erroneous behavior, a user will file a detailed bug report allowing the code’s author
to fix the bug.
This informal testing can be effective, but it is far from complete. The instrumentation framework
described above can be used to measure how incomplete it really is. This achieves a tangible security
benefit: knowing the well-tested (even if informally) code paths allows one to concentrate code
auditing efforts on the less-used (and therefore less informally-tested) code paths. By virtue of
undergoing less exercise, these latter paths are more likely to harbor potentially-exploitable bugs.
I used the bb-count.d probe script described above to gather the number of times each basic
block in FreeBSD’s USB stack was executed. I then inserted a USB thumbdrive (which uses the
umass driver within the USB stack), read a single block of data, wrote a single block of data, and
ejected the drive. Finally, I terminated the probe script. These actions exercised the normal code
path for USB device enumeration, USB mass storage device initialization, read and write interaction
between the USB stack and the FreeBSD storage subsystem, USB mass storage device finalization,
and USB device removal.
By process of elimination, then, we can deduce the abnormal code path. To that end, Figure 4.4
shows the number of basic blocks exercised (and not exercised) per file in FreeBSD’s USB stack
during the experiment described above. I did not see any variation in this data over multiple
runs; but variation would certainly be cause for concern! It would indicate that, despite inducing











Figure 4.4: Lines of code exercised per-file during a USB thumbdrive insertion, read, write, and
removal.
introducing irregularity: a potential malicious actor [26].
4.2.2 Guiding Hook Placement
A more specific use of the basic-block traces is to identify where in the data-processing control flow
would be most advantageous to place enforcement hooks. That is, the function traces produced by
the framework described in this chapter are caused by activity happening on the USB. If we want
to make sure that said activity follows the rules of the protocol and/or conforms with a user-defined
policy, we need to examine it. Code that implements this examination must be called at some point
in the control flow revealed by these traces. But where?
This is a Goldilocks game of finding a place in the code that all USB events traverse. Ideally,
for efficiency reasons, we want the enforcement hooks invoked no more than once per event. On the
other hand, we need the enforcement hooks invoked at least once per event, otherwise enforcement
will miss events and lose its power. The basic-block traces described in this chapter provide precisely
the data necessary to discern where to put the enforcement hooks. These are described in detail
in Section 5.5 along with the rest of the work involved in integrating the enforcement system into
FreeBSD.
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4.2.3 Showing Inter-component Interactions
Finally, I used the traces produced by my instrumentation of FreeBSD’s USB stack to generate
graphs of the control flow between components within the stack. The source code is divided into
separate files by function (e.g., the controller interface is in controller/ehci.c, request handling
is in usb request.c, DMA operations are in usb busdma.c); therefore, I chose source files as a


















































































































































































In this chapter, I describe how I instrumented the FreeBSD USB stack using DTRACE probes.
I used this instrumentation to map the basic blocks within the stack that are exercised during
normal operating conditions; by extension, I identified the basic blocks that don’t get exercised,
which therefore might be good places to focus a security audit. These efforts come together in my
empirical evaluation of my parser/firewall’s efficacy at stopping malicious inputs.
I also foreshadowed how I would use the results of the instrumentation to inform the placement
of enforcement hooks that validate USB frames as they flow between host and device. Lastly, I
present diagrams that describe the various inter-component interactions within the USB stack.
4.2.5 Realization
The instrumentation I describe in this chapter is part and parcel with the in-kernel implementation
of the protocol. As such, the appropriate party to implement it is the kernel maintainers. We have
seen this in the DTRACE system in FreeBSD; Solaris and its derivatives are similarly equipped.
Linux has a similar framework called SystemTap. Microsoft Windows has a variety of monitoring
systems built in [32]. All that remains, therefore, is for an enterprising kernel maintainer to write




In Section 1.2, I offered a programme of code artifacts necessary to implement support for a protocol
and claimed that, given a specification of the protocol in question, this code could be automagically
generated. I intentionally eschew the term “automatically” because it does not encompass the
structural qualities of the resulting code; rather, I use the word “automag ically” to mean that the
code exhibits additional properties that make it amenable to further automatic processing, such as
formal verification. The distinction is not a trivial one; for example, without substantial effort on
behalf of the programmer, the outputs of yacc and bison are likely not formally verifiable.
In preceding chapters, I describe my efforts to manually implement components that inject crafted
USB data onto the bus and provide a view of the code touched by the injected data. This chapter
describes the centerpiece of the programme, the autogeneration framework; the previous pieces are
merely needed to support and test it. I describe what a protocol specification entails, how the code
is generated, and how it is integrated into a production operating system kernel.
I claim that a great deal of code—in fact, much of the code that handles a protocol within
the kernel—can be generated automagically from a specification of the protocol. Consequently, the
ad-hoc code that performs these operations can be replaced in actual operating-system kernels and
protocol stacks with generated code without appreciable loss of efficiency and with significant gains
in security (e.g., ability to mitigate malicious inputs). I present a case study that demonstrates how
this works for USB.
Specifically, I claim the data structure(s) that hold protocol messages, the code that parses
messages from the wire into these data structures and verifies their contents, functions that access













Figure 5.1: Given a protocol specification, shown in the middle, we can automagically generate the
code required to implement support for that protocol, shown in the leaves.
format can all be generated. Figure 5.1 shows a diagram of the code that is generated from the
protocol specification.
I begin with a description of the protocol-definition language I embedded into Haskell. Following
that, I show how a portion of the USB protocol is defined using this language, specifically the
GET DESCRIPTOR request message sent from the device to the host during enumeration. I extrapolate
on that definition to describe the code generated for the entire set of messages and close with a
description of how I integrated this generated code into the FreeBSD kernel.
Note that the definitions and generated code I describe in this chapter are a result of my efforts
related to USB. They are, however, directly relevant to any protocol for which one wishes to
implement parsers (though, admittedly, they are more amenable to binary protocols like TCP/IP
rather than text protocols like SMTP and HTTP). My intent is to provide the foundation upon which
myriad other parsers can be built and, most importantly, integrated with their existing stacks,
replacing notoriously vulnerable ad-hoc implementations [9]. For this reason, in what follows I
describe the construction of my USB parser in most generic terms, only using protocol-specific
terminology when such is specific to USB (as in the case of USB enumeration).
5.1 Protocol Definition
I define a Protocol to be a set of Messages. Each Message consists of a name, a set of Fields, and
potentially a data stage of variable length. (Figure 5.2 shows the definition of a Message using
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data Message = Message MessageName [Field] DataLen
type MessageName = String
Figure 5.2: Specification of a Message within a protocol. A Message is defined by a name (a String),
a list of Fields, and a data length specifier.
the domain-specific language.) As simple as it appears, this definition describes every message
exchanged during USB enumeration, dubbed “control messages”. Following enumeration, however,
most communication is application-specific and supporting such protocols using this framework
reduces to the task of creating Message variables corresponding to the application-specific messages.
Control messages still flow between device and host even after enumeration is complete, however, as
they negotiate features like flow control and isochronous transfers.
The first value in a Message is a character string used for identification purposes. Following the
name is a list of Fields that make up the Message (how to specify names, types, etc. for these fields
is discussed below). Fields are assumed to be ordered and contiguous within the Message; should
the protocol specify empty space or padding, one would need to specify an explicit Field reflecting
those characteristics.
Let us express these and further relationships between the elements in a message in a grammar
that, at the same time, is the Haskell definition of the types within the protocol DSL. Message
and field names are thus Haskell type constructors; the entire DSL is thus a runnable definition
and is therefore subject to the Haskell type-checking framework, which is an effective form of static
verification [41].
Each Field in a Message consists of a name and a size, as well as an indication of whether
its contents are literal or variable. (The definition of the Field type is shown in Figure 5.3.) Like
Message, a Field incorporates a character string used to identify it. The size of the field is either 8 or
16 bits—this covers all messages exchanged during USB enumeration and could easily be expanded
to support the needs of other protocols, even those requiring bit-granularity.
The last field indicates whether the field is literal or variable. Many protocols specify an exact
sequence of bits or bytes to appear in certain places: for instance, IPv4 requires that the first 4
bits of an IP packet be 0100, indicating the version of IP to which the packet conforms. Likewise,
USB requires that, e.g., GET DESCRIPTOR request messages have a RequestType field of 0x80 and a
Request value of 6. These would be specified as Literal fields, along with the value they require.
Alternatively, some fields are not precisely specified and instead must be available to higher-level
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data Field = Field FieldName FieldSize FieldValue
type FieldName = String
data FieldSize = Uint8
| Uint16
data FieldValue = Literal Int
| Variable
Figure 5.3: Specification of a Field within a Message. A Field is defined by a name (a String), a size
(in this case, 8 or 16 bits), and an indication of whether its value is variable or fixed
data DataLen = NoData
| Bytes Int
| Ref FieldName
Figure 5.4: Specification of the length of the data stage of a Message. The length can be zero, a
fixed number of bytes, or a number of bytes given in one of the fields of the Message.
code that, e.g., changes state within the kernel upon the receipt of such a message. Examples of
this include the destination port number in TCP and the index of the descriptor being requested
by a USB GET DESCRIPTOR request message. These would be specified as Variable fields so that the
appropriate code can be produced.
The list of Fields is of fixed size and the Fields themselves are of fixed size; thus, the entire
Message described so far is of fixed size. These fields may be followed by a variable-sized data stage:
the size may be zero, a fixed size, or of a size given by one of the fields. The definition of the DataLen
type is shown in Figure 5.4.
Many messages in the USB protocol communicate no data, and therefore use the NoData con-
structor for this field. Some messages include a fixed amount of data following the header, in which
case they use the “Bytes” constructor, specifying the number of bytes as the argument. Lastly, some
messages (of which the response to the GET DESCRIPTOR request is one) specify the length in one of
the Fields, in which case the “Ref” constructor is used. If the length is specified in the wLength
field, the DataLen constructor would appear as Ref "wLength".
Note that while the DataLen construct fulfills the needs of USB, it also immediately supports
protocols like IP and SCSI that have a similar structure. The latter (and many other protocol
besides) feature headers comprised of fixed-size fields followed by a variable-sized payload or data
field. This syntactic simplicity indicates the data modeling approach is likely generally applicable.
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getDescriptorRequest :: Message
getDescriptorRequest = Message "GET_DESCRIPTOR req"
[ Field "request_type" Uint8 (Literal 0x80)
, Field "request" Uint8 (Literal 6)
, Field "desc_type" Uint8 Variable
, Field "desc_index" Uint8 Variable
, Field "language_id" Uint16 Variable
, Field "desc_length" Uint16 Variable
]
NoData
Figure 5.5: Description of USB protocol’s GET DESCRIPTOR request message, written in the domain-
specific language.
5.1.1 Example: GET DESCRIPTOR request message
As an example, consider the GET DESCRIPTOR request message, whose specification is shown in
Figure 5.5. The first parameter specifies the name (which will be used in a number of places in the
generated code). Following that are six fields: four 8-bit unsigned integers and two 16-bit unsigned
integers. The first two fields have literal values whereas the final four are marked as variable, to be
interpreted above the parsing layer. Finally, this message does not include any trailing data.
The GET DESCRIPTOR message exercises most of the message-specification features discussed
above—fields of different sizes, of both literal and variable contents, as well as a null data stage—but
not all. The fixed-length data stage is used in the GET STATUS response, GET CONFIGURATION re-
sponse, and SYNCH FRAME messages. The variable-length data stage is used in a number of messages,
many of which are closely related to other messages.
5.1.2 Specifying New Messages from Old Messages
Many protocols include related pairs of messages; think ICMP echo request and reply, DNS request
and reply, and so on. The USB protocol does, as well; the GET DESCRIPTOR request message shown
above is the request half of such a pair. For our protocol syntax specification to be complete, we
need to specify the format of the response, but it seems wasteful and potentially error-prone to
specify the message entirely from scratch.
For USB, many of these request/response pairs differ only in that the response includes a data
stage and the request does not. Therefore, I created a Haskell function, withData that takes a
Message instance, gives it a new name and a new data stage specification, and produces a new
Message. Figure 5.6 shows how I used this function to specify the GET DESCRIPTOR response message.
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getDescriptorResponse :: Message
getDescriptorResponse = withData getDescriptorRequest
"GET_DESCRIPTOR response"
(Ref "desc_length ")
Figure 5.6: Code to derive the GET DESCRIPTOR response from the associated request message, using
the domain-specific language.
While the withData function is no doubt useful, it is most certainly specific to USB. The
general lesson here is not, however, that the framework I’ve created is inextricably tied to USB;
rather, this demonstrates the power of an embedded domain-specific language. Because the protocol-
specification language is really just Haskell, we have at our fingertips all the tools that Haskell
provides, which let us quickly, easily, and—most importantly—reliably produce specifications of
derived messages. Were we left to specify these messages by hand in entirety, we run the risk of
introducing typos and inconsistencies, both of which are a breeding ground for vulnerabilities.
5.2 Generating the Code
As shown pictorially in Figure 5.1, we can use the message definitions described in Section 5.1 to
produce other code pertaining to those messages. These various code artifacts are described in the
following subsections. All generation code is written in Haskell.
5.2.1 Generating the Data Structure
First and foremost, we need a data structure to represent each message. This structure can (and
likely should) be used both in the kernel proper as well as the parsing component. Additionally,
it could be used in programs that inject protocol data such as the Facedancer and its associated
software described in Chapter 3 as well as programs such as tcpdump that analyze protocol traces.
Figure 5.7 shows the structure definition generated from the GET DESCRIPTOR response message
shown in Figure 5.6. (This example shows the response rather than the request because the presence
of a data stage in the response exposes a particular implementation quirk that merits mention.)
Defining fields for fixed-size types is straightforward: the Uint8 and Uint16 of the definition from
Figure 5.5 become uint8 t and uint16 t, which are types supplied by standard system headers.
The only deviation from this pattern is the data member.











Figure 5.7: Generated C structure for the GET DESCRIPTOR request message.
Should the kernel, application, or parser wish to access the contents of the data stage, they need to
do so using the address of the data member. This is potentially fraught with peril as undisciplined
pointer operations are a significant source of security vulnerabilities. Therefore, I have also generated
accessor functions (described in Section 5.2.3) that unify the method of access and therefore reduce
the potential for misuse.
5.2.2 Generating the Parser/Verifier
The primary purpose of the parser/verifier function is to ensure that the raw bits received over
the wire (metaphorical or otherwise) conform to the protocol specification. It must check both
the contents of the individual fields where applicable as well as aspects of the entire frame—most
significantly, its length, so as to avoid vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed [46]. The generated parser
function for the GET DESCRIPTOR request message is shown in Figure 5.8.
Some things in this function are worthy of note. First, many of the fields are not examined: this
is reasonable because the contents of those fields either do not affect the validity of the message or
their validity is only verifiable given more information about the state of the connection. In short,
this function is concerned with message syntax, not semantics.
For instance, the desc index field of a GET DESCRIPTOR response message should match the
desc index field of the initial GET DESCRIPTOR request, but the parser cannot know such things
without maintaining significant application-specific state. Such state is more the purview of a
separate component that verifies the validity of sequence of messages rather than each individual
message in the sequence; this work is focussed solidly on the latter problem. A similar separation
exists in the NetFilter architecture, where keeping track of state is relegated to distinct code such
as ConnTrack, which keeps track of stateful protocols such as TCP. The state tracked may be exact
as per protocol specification or, as in the case of TCP, approximated.
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struct get_descriptor_req_msg *
validate_get_descriptor_req_msg(char *frame , int framelen)
{
struct get_descriptor_req_msg *m =
(struct get_descriptor_req_msg *) frame;
if(m == NULL) return NULL;
if(framelen < 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 0) return NULL;
if(m->request_type != 128) return NULL;
if(m->request != 6) return NULL;
/* accept m->desc_type as -is */
/* accept m->desc_index as -is */
/* accept m->language_id as -is */
/* accept m->desc_length as -is */
return m;
}
Figure 5.8: Generated verification function for the GET DESCRIPTOR request message. (Constant-






Figure 5.9: Generated C accessors for the GET DESCRIPTOR request message. (The duplicate “get”
substring is not a typo: the first a verb, the second is part of the noun.)
5.2.3 Generating Accessor Functions
While the data members of structures generated by the code described in Section 5.2.1 can be used
to access the individual fields of a message, there are advantages to using discrete accessor functions,
and compiler tricks can make them just as efficient as direct access methods. Figure 5.9 shows the
accessor functions for the GET DESCRIPTOR request message.
The usability of these accessor macros could be improved by implementing them as functions
instead, which would allow the compiler to provide more meaningful error messages. The type of
the parameter m would then be specified (whereas in a macro it is not), thus nominally ensuring
that only the correct type of message has its accessed in this way. (One could imagine a case where
a different kind of message also has a field named desc length, but located in a different place
within the message. The macros do not protect against using an instance of the latter in place of





log(LOG_INFO , "usb_fw: GET_DESCRIPTOR req , desc_type =%d,"
"desc_index =%d,language_id =%d, desc_length =%d\n",
m->desc_type , m->desc_index , m->language_id ,
m->desc_length );
log(LOG_INFO , "usb_fw: data stage=%s\n", bytes_as_hex (&m->data ,
m->desc_length ));
}
Figure 5.10: Generated C function for legibly printing a GET DESCRIPTOR request message.
that the compiler can produce code as efficient as if they were macros.
Another advantage of using accessor functions (macros) like these is that any endianness mod-
ifications can be incorporated into the functions themselves. While this isn’t an issue in USB, it
most certainly is an issue in traditional networking protocols such as the TCP/IP stack. Using only
accessor functions (macros) that have the endianness conversion incorporated could be a benefit.
Admittedly, these names might be unwieldy. The good news is that, being automagically gen-
erated, they can be easily changed. For instance, one could write a function to shorten names and
apply it to all identifiers simultaneously.
5.2.4 Generating the Pretty-Printer Function
We also require the ability to present the details of a message in a user-friendly format. While
perhaps not strictly necessary within the kernel proper, this feature is vital to user-facing tools that
inspect protocol traffic. (For example, a protocol-specific tool analogous to tcpdump for TCP/IP
protocols.) Figure 5.10 shows the generated pretty-printing function for the GET DESCRIPTOR request
message.
Note that each field is correctly formatted according to its type, the literal fields are elided from
the output, and the data stage is outputted as hex, using the previously-verified length. (NB: the
generated function uses the FreeBSD-specific log function and LOG INFO log-level. The reasons for
this are explained in Section 5.5.2.)
5.3 User-Defined Policies
As described in Section 1.2, one of the features we would like in a firewall is the ability to specify
a policy to augment the built-in rules. For instance, imagine a case where a particular USB device
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Reject string_descriptor where length = 42
Reject set_address where address > 127
Figure 5.11: Example user policies for the USB firewall.
driver doesn’t correctly handle a string descriptor with a length of exactly 42. Instead of entirely
disabling support for that device or waiting for a new driver, a system administrator might want to
filter out all USB frames that contain the offending length value.
To fulfill this need, I devised a simple language to describe policies, a parser for that language,
and code that uses the previously-written protocol definition to produce a loadable kernel module
that implements the policy. Currently, the policy in this kernel module is applied after the frame is
validated but before the connection-tracking logic to be described in Section 5.5. (An improvement
to my system would be to allow for more flexible policy-application orderings.) Some example
policies are shown in Figure 5.11.
These policies are, admittedly, not especially eloquent. In particular, they do not take into
account the context in which a message is being sent and are therefore something of a blunt instru-
ment. A subtler and more targeted approach would be to augment a detailed state machine with
such rules, but that is more semantic than syntactic and is beyond the scope of this work. Again,
however, NetFilter shows a possible direction in which modules specified with the policy provide
additional predicates for checking state as needed.
5.4 Protocol: Assemble!
The preceding sections have described the generation of individual chunks of code necessary for
each message of the protocol in question. What remains is to generate all these code chunks for
every message, place them in well-formed source files, and integrate them with the target operating
system.
For the USB protocol proof-of-concept, I defined instances of the Message type for the following
messages (where applicable, related message types are listed together).
• GET STATUS request response
• CLEAR FEATURE and SET FEATURE
• SET ADDRESS
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• GET DESCRIPTOR request
• SET DESCRIPTOR
• GET CONFIGURATION request and response
• SET CONFIGURATION
• GET INTERFACE request and response
• SET INTERFACE
• SYNCH FRAME
I also defined instances of the Message type for the following descriptors. These descriptors are








Taken together, these requests, responses, and descriptors encompass all data that flows between
host and device during the USB enumeration process.
The data structure definitions, accessor macros, and function prototypes are generated into a file
called usb messages.h. The validation functions and pretty-printing functions are generated into a
file called usb messages.c. Both of these source files are intended to integrate with any operating
system kernel or application (though a few idiosyncrasies remain: see Section 5.5.2).
5.5 Operation System Integration
This generated code is all well and good, but it needs to get itself into an operating system to make
any difference. I achieve this by means of a thin translation shim, described below, whose design
was guided by the instrumentation described in Chapter 4.
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I chose to integrate with FreeBSD because of its reputation as a widely-deployed, high-performance
kernel with a clean and well-documented design. (After considerable time spent digging through
kernel source code, I concluded this reputation is merited.)
Running the Haskell code on the USB protocol specification results in two files, usb messages.h
and usb messages.c, that implement the various constructs described in this chapter. They are
intended to be as operating-system agnostic as possible (exceptions are discussed in Section 5.5.2).
I separately implemented a FreeBSD kernel module that, when loaded, provides a function that
the mainline USB stack can call to verify a set of frames. This function is primarily responsible for
extracting the relevant fields of the structure FreeBSD uses to describe a USB transfer and calling
an OS-agnostic function with the frame and the extracted fields as parameters. The idea is that
integrating with a new operating system will require one to re-implement only this translation shim
and leave the rest of the validation code intact.
This OS-agnostic code is contained in usb fw.h and usb fw.c, which currently implements a
simple policy in which a response is verified to match the request that instigated it. It is intended
not to demonstrate a complicated, stateful firewall for USB but rather how the primitives provided
by the automagically-generated code can be used to do so.
Table 5.1 summarizes the files involved. The primary takeaway from this table is the significant
discrepancy between manually-written lines of code and automagically-generated lines of code, the
latter of which are far more likely to be correct. This is not because of some magical fairy dust
involved in the autogeneration process, but rather because all of the code is produced in a uniform
fashion. Bugs need only be fixed once in the generation code and all the constructs that are gener-
ated are positively affected. In contrast, fixing a single bug in a manually-written parser does not
guarantee that same bug doesn’t exist in another component that performs a similar operation.
Once the kernel module is loaded, a frame is processed thusly:
1. When execution reaches one of three points in the USB stack, call fbsd hook, giving it the
FreeBSD-specific structure that describes the transfer (which may contain multiple, raw USB
frames). In Section 5.5.1, I describe the method I developed to place these hooks.
2. Within fbsd hook, extract transfer metadata—such as bus number, device address, and end-
point number—from the FreeBSD-specific structure and pass each frame in turn to hook frame
along with the OS-agnosticized metadata.
3. The hook frame function validates the frame, which results in an action (such as accept, drop,
or reject) being passed back to fbsd hook.
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Filename LOC Description
usb messages.h 403 structure definitions, accessor macros definitions, and function
prototypes (auto-generated)
usb messages.c 367 parser functions and pretty-printing functions (auto-generated)
usb fw fbsd.c 105 FreeBSD-specific code, contains fbsd hook function that invokes
OS-agnostic code
usb fw.h 14 definitions for OS-agnostic functions
usb fw.c 71 rudimentary firewall for USB using the auto-generated parser
primitives
Table 5.1: The files, both automagically and manually generated, that comprise the USB validation
proof-of-concept; along with their sizes, measured in lines of code, and a brief description of their
purpose.
4. Finally, fbsd hook returns the action back to the USB stack.
Figure 5.12 shows the path by which a frame is processed by the generated verification framework.
But where are these magical, “appropriate places” whence fbsd hook is called?
5.5.1 Hooks
The method for locating hooks is as follows. Although applied to USB in this chapter, it can be
easily generalized to other protocols.
In particular, given the fbsd hook function described in the previous section, where in the USB
stack proper does it get invoked? The instrumentation described in Chapter 4 revealed that all
frames entering the kernel over USB did so in the usbd callback wrapper function and that all
frames exiting the kernel over USB did so in either the usbd transfer start cb or usbd pipe start
functions. Therefore, it was in those functions that I placed the hooks to call into the firewall. I
evaluate the effectiveness of these placements in the next chapter where I discuss whether my system
fulfills the requirement of complete mediation as described in Section 1.4.
5.5.2 Obstacles to Operating System Independence
This is not to say that the idiosyncrasies introduced by particular operating systems are trivial:







Figure 5.12: When a USB frame arrives or is sent, the FreeBSD USB stack calls the shim function,
fbsd hook, which translates the FreeBSD-formatted USB frame metadata to an OS-agnostic format
before passing it along to the generated parser/validator function. The resulting action is cascaded
back to the kernel.
FreeBSD are described in the following.
The vast majority of the generated code described in the preceding sections is operating-system
agnostic; header files are the primary exception. For instance, the uint8 t type is used frequently,
but the file in which it is defined varies. The FreeBSD kernel uses <sys/types.h>, the Linux
kernel uses <linux/types.h>, and both userlands use <stdint.h>. The generated code currently
supports only FreeBSD with hard-coded header-file inclusions, but this could easily be expanded
to other operating systems either by generating #ifdef/#endif clauses for each or by adding an
abstraction layer that allows the author to specify differences between platforms.
The other operating-system specific code, as foreshadowed in Section 5.2.4, comprises the func-
tions generated to pretty-print the content of messages. As shown in Figure 5.10, these functions
currently use the logging interface exposed by the FreeBSD kernel. There are a few different ways
this could be ported to another operating system. One is by using an OS-specific abstraction layer
as suggested to solve the header-file problem described in the previous paragraph.
My current preference, however, is to re-implement these functions to instead behave like snprintf:
returning a pointer to a string instead of perforning the actual logging itself. One benefit of this
approach is that such code could be used outside the kernel (e.g., in a program like tcpdump that
monitors traffic on a bus and presents it in a user-friendly format). The difficulty is that allocating
memory for such strings inside the kernel can be a delicate affair, and different kernels prefer differ-
ent patterns for doing so. Therefore, it seems like an OS-specific abstraction layer is inevitable, but
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this merits investigation before committing to a particular strategy.
5.6 Putting It All Together
This chapter presents the key component of my programme: the automagic generator that turns
a protocol description written in an embedded domain-specific language into the code ready for
integration into a production operating system as well as specific issues related to such integration.
I created this code for the USB protocol, and my work to integrate this implementation with the
FreeBSD kernel. It now remains to evaluate the resultant system according to the desiderata enu-
merated in Section 1.2; namely, that the resulting system preserves the protocol functionality and
adds the ability to filter out malicious traffic. This is the topic of the next chapter.
5.7 Realization
The mechanisms I outline in this chapter are more involved, complex, and far-reaching than those
in previous chapters and therefore the responsibility for implementing them is more distributed.
The definition of the formal protocol specification itself is best left to the group creating the refer-
ence implementation of the protocol. This group could also implement the code that generates all
the operating-system agnostic functions: the message verifier, accessors, pretty-printers, and user-
defined policy engine. (Should either of these not happen, one strength of the design is that any
entity could produce these components and share them with all interested parties.) Then it is up
to the maintainers of individual operating systems to implement the shim that bridges their kernel
with the generated code.
Finally come the user-defined policies. With support built into the implementations as generated,
the question becomes: who writes the policies and who distributes them? The first point to consider
is that policies could serve multiple purposes. Some organizations could seek to limit the types
of, e.g., USB devices that can be connected to computers under their control, in which case the
orgnization’s IT department would be responsible for devising and distributing their set of preferred
policies. On the other hand, policies that protect against particular vulnerabilites could be written
by the discoverer of the vulnerability or the vendor of the vulnerable component. In either case, the
policy would be distributed via some public mechanism such as the Web or an e-mail list and the




The USB firewall described in the previous chapter is all well and good, but how do we know it
performs as advertised? That is, how do we know that the generated parser is actually effective?
The following questions examine the various angles of effectiveness of a firewall.
1. Is the firewall stable? Does it handle the USB protocol without crashing? Inserting more code
into the kernel runs the risk of adding points of instability that an attacker could exploit to
deny access to the rest of the machine. We must show that the firewall does not crash in the
face of both legitimate and malformed USB traffic.
2. Does the firewall examine every USB frame received by the computer? If there exist avenues
by which frames can reach the kernel innards without being inspected by the firewall, the
firewall is not doing its job. We must show that all frames pass through the policy. (This is
the notion of complete mediation, described in Chapter 1.)
3. In performing its job, does the firewall incur a reasonable amount of overhead? One of the
claims made in Chapter 1 is that the generated code would be sufficiently performant to justify
its inclusion in a production-quality kernel: we must show that.
4. Finally, and most significantly, does the firewall prevent malformed USB frames from entering
the kernel? That is, does the firewall actually do the job it claims to do?
This chapter will answer these questions in the context of the USB firewall I implemented.
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host (Linux) Facedancer target (FreeBSD)
Figure 6.1: Diagram of testing setup. Software (in this case, umap) running on the “testing host”
(left) causes the Facedancer to emulate a variety of USB devices when connected to the “target”
(right).
6.1 Methodology
The primary tool I used to test my USB firewall was umap [21], a USB host security assessment
tool designed to test a broad cross-section of USB devices and, by extension, a broad cross-section
of the USB protocol itself. Written by Andy Davis of NCC Group, it uses the Facedancer hardware
described in Chapter 3 to emulate a wide variety of devices, both well-behaving and otherwise. The
umap application itself is built on top of the software stack I wrote and described in Chapter 3. To
the best of my knowledge, umap represents the state-of-the-art in testing the security of host-side
USB implementations.
The umap test suite contains the largest set of known USB vulnerability triggers. All told, I ran
nearly its 500 different vulnerability triggers against my USB parser/firewall; a finer breakdown of
the tests is shown in Table 6.1.
Figure 6.1 shows the testing setup. The Facedancer, which umap uses to physically inject its
stimuli onto the USB, has two ports: “host” and “target”. The former is connected to a USB port
on the machine controlling the test and the later is connected to a USB port on the machine being
tested. When these connections are made, the host detects a standard USB serial device whereas
the target detects no device at all. Only when software (e.g., umap) is run on the host that causes
the Facedancer to emulate a particular device does the target actually see a device connect. Once
that happens, the software running on the host controls nearly all aspects of the emulated device’s
behavior (exceptions discussed below).
Using this setup, I first identified the drivers supported by both umap and FreeBSD and then I
tested the intersection of those sets.
6.1.1 Identifying testable drivers
The umap software package supports a variety of testing modes. I first ran it in “identification”
mode to determine which devices were supported by the FreeBSD target so that I could focus on
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\$ ./umap.py -P /dev/ttyUSB0 -i
01:01:00 - Audio : Audio control : PR Protocol undefined
** SUPPORTED **
01:02:00 - Audio : Audio streaming : PR Protocol undefined
** SUPPORTED **
02:02:01 - CDC Control : Abstract Control Model : AT commands V.250
02:03: ff - CDC Control : Telephone Control Model : Vendor specific
02:06:00 - CDC Control : Ethernet Networking Control Model : No \
class -specific protocol required
03:00:00 - Human Interface Device : No subclass : None
network socket=False
** SUPPORTED **
06:01:01 - Image : Still image capture device : Bulk -only protocol
07:01:02 - Printer : Default : Bidirectional interface
** SUPPORTED ???**
08:06:50 - Mass Storage : SCSI : BBB
** SUPPORTED **
09:00:00 - Hub : Default : Default
** SUPPORTED **
0a:00:00 - CDC Data : Default : Default
0b:00:00 - Smart Card : Default : Default
Figure 6.2: Output of umap running in identification mode. (Slightly edited to remove umap banner
and long lines.) Of the device classes testable by umap, five are supported in the FreeBSD target:
audio control, audio stream, human interface devices (mice and keyboards), printers, mass storage
(e.g., thumbdrives), and hubs.
these in the remainder of my testing. Figure 6.2 shows the output of this mode.
First and foremost, this output demonstrates that the kernel on the machine being tested did
not ever crash while being probed by umap—despite umap being a tool explicitly designed to cause
such crashes! This is a first step to showing that the firewall is stable in the face of real USB traffic.
Secondly, the output tells us that, of the many device classes supported by umap, six are also
supported by FreeBSD and are therefore available to fuzz: audio control, audio streaming, human
interface devices (e.g., mice and keyboards), printers, mass storage (e.g., thumbdrives), and hubs.
6.1.2 Fuzz-testing individual drivers
With these six device classes in hand, I proceeded to test each individually using umap’s fuzz-testing
feature. This feature causes the Facedancer to emulate a particular device and, as part of the USB
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enumeration phase, send one frame that pushes the bounds of the specification. For instance, where
the kernel might expect to receive an 8-bit field that contains 0x02, umap would perform one test
where it sends 0x00 in this field and another where it sends 0xFF, the idea being to verify that the
kernel safely handles extreme cases.
For each device class, umap supports a large number of such tests: I ran them all. The USB fire-
wall was configured with no user-policy rules; only the generated validation functions were invoked.
Figure 6.3 shows a sample of the output from a single fuzz-testing run. Each line represents a single
test, the nature of which is described on the far right.
I ran into an interesting issue when using umap to test human interface devices (HID, class
03:00:00 from Figure 6.2). The firewall successfully recognizes and rejects umap’s “Configura-
tion bDescriptorType null” test, in which the emulated device sends a configuration descriptor with
the bDescriptorType field set to 0x00. But because this malformed descriptor is silently rejected,
FreeBSD continues to wait for a correct response, eventually timing out. When performed repeat-
edly, this test causes some state within the FreeBSD kernel to become sufficiently out of whack that
no HID device will be successfully recognized, whether it conforms to the protocol or not. This sug-
gests there is a bug within the FreeBSD kernel that allows for a denial-of-service when performing
incomplete enumeration of HID devices. Further umap tests of the HID device class exhibit this
behavior as well, so I elided them from the test suite.
Thus, rather than undermining my methodology, this “failure” in fact highlights a potentially
significant flaw in the underlying operating system which relies on rejection by timeout rather than
rejection by content. While developing this behavior into a proof-of-concept exploit is beyond the
scope of this thesis, the root cause is likely non-trivial. The fact remains, however: my system
discovered this bug.
Table 6.1 summarizes the results of the fuzzing runs: all tests over all five remaining device
classes, totalling 483 different tests and over 6000 frames sent by umap to the FreeBSD target being
tested.
Once again, during all this testing, the firewall stayed stable. This is particularly notable because
these tests are actively probing the dark, dirty corners of device behavior. If the firewall does not
crash under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that well-behaved devices will cause it to
crash. Therefore, considering that umap is an industry-standard tool for testing the stability of
USB implementations, my testing suggests the firewall is stable for production use.
This claim of stability might seem unreasonable in the face of the HID behavior described at the
beginning of this section. I contend it is eminently reasonable: the firewall itself did the correct thing
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\$ ./umap.py -P /dev/ttyUSB0 -f 01:01:00:A
Fuzzing:
01:01:00 - Audio : Audio control : PR Protocol undefined
** SUPPORTED **
Enumeration phase ...
2015/11/21 19:40:27 Enumeration phase: 0000 - Device_bLength_null
2015/11/21 19:40:34 Enumeration phase: 0001 - Device_bLength_lower
2015/11/21 19:40:41 Enumeration phase: 0002 - Device_bLength_higher
2015/11/21 19:40:48 Enumeration phase: 0003 - Device_bLength_max
2015/11/21 19:40:56 Enumeration phase: 0004 - \
Device_bDescriptorType_null
2015/11/21 19:41:06 Enumeration phase: 0005 - \
Device_bDescriptorType_invalid
2015/11/21 19:41:17 Enumeration phase: 0006 - \
Device_bMaxPacketSize0_null
2015/11/21 19:41:25 Enumeration phase: 0007 - \
Device_bMaxPacketSize0_max
2015/11/21 19:41:32 Enumeration phase: 0008 - \
String_Manufacturer_overflow
2015/11/21 19:41:39 Enumeration phase: 0009 - \
String_Product_overflow
...
Figure 6.3: Sample output from umap fuzzing Audio Control devices. The “A” in the final command-
line argument causes umap to run “all” tests. The umap banner has been removed and the output
has been truncated (full output runs 119 lines and is summarized in Table 6.1).
USB identifier device type tests frames sent
01:01:00 Audio control 94 1873
01:02:00 Audio streaming 94 1873
07:01:02 Printer 131 1735
08:06:50 Mass storage 101 1506
09:00:00 Hub 63 898
total 483 6397
Table 6.1: Data sent by umap fuzz-testing.
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test sent received missed frames
Audio control 1873 1961 0
Audio streaming 1873 1961 0
Printer 1735 1860 0
Mass Storage 1506 1760 0
Hub 898 955 0
Table 6.2: Complete mediation test results. For each test, shows number of USB frames sent by
umap and the number of frames processed by the USB firewall of the machine being tested.
under those circumstances whereas the kernel code being protected failed to do the correct thing
upon rejection of the frame. Note that all frames are rejected using the same procedure: the “error”
field of the USB transfer structure is set to 1. During USB HID device enumeration, the kernel
seems to incorrectly handle this return value; whereas it correctly recovers from all other rejections.
While certainly necessary, this declaration is not sufficient to endorse the firewall entirely. It
remains to show that it is effective at protecting against the evils it claims to deter.
6.2 Complete Mediation
The first step in showing that the firewall protects against such evils is to show that it actively
examines all the data that flows over the bus; that is, that it implements complete mediation.
To empirically test whether every single frame sent by umap is evaluated by the USB firewall, I
configured umap to print a message whenever it sends a frame and I instrumented and configured
the firewall to print a message whenever it evaluates a frame. I configured both to also print the
raw bytes of the frame being sent or evaluated. Then I ran the entire fuzz-testing suite described in
Section 6.1 and gathered the results shown in Table 6.2.
The first two numerical columns tell a bizarre story: how is the firewall receiving more frames
than are being sent? The answer lies in the MAXUSB controller chip that sits on the Facedancer
board itself, which automatically responds to some USB requests without consulting the software
stack. For instance, the Facedancer automatically responds to the SET ADDRESS request and thus
such a request/response pair shows up in the kernel logs on the FreeBSD target being tested, but
the umap log only shows the request being received.
Since I had logged the raw bytes being sent by umap and received by the firewall, I was able to
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Figure 6.4: To capture USB data sent by the Facedancer, I connected the Beagle USB 12 Protocol
Analyzer as a pass-through device between the Facedancer and the FreeBSD target; then I connected
the Analysis port of the Beagle back to the testing host to capture packets.
check the differences in actual data being sent and received. Every single frame sent by umap was
analyzed by the firewall. No exceptions. Some frames were received that the umap software did not
send; those all fell into the category of automatic responses generated by the MAXUSB chip on the
Facedancer board. But not one frame sent by umap evaded the firewall’s oversight.
A More Rigorous Test While these results are encouraging, they are not conclusive. To make
them conclusive, I used a Beagle USB 12 Protocol Analyzer [5] from Total Phase to capture all USB
data sent by umap to the FreeBSD target. The Beagle USB 12 sits between the Facedancer and the
target and mirrors all USB data to the computer connected to its “Analysis” port (see Figure 6.4). I
re-ran the umap fuzz tests for the five device classes shown above and recorded all packets observed
by the Beagle and all packets mediated by the USB firewall on the FreeBSD target.
As in the informal testing described above, there were some discrepancies between the sequence
of USB packets reported by the Beagle and the set of USB packets mediated by the firewall. These
discrepancies fell into two categories:
1. When the host (i.e., the FreeBSD target) queries the device (i.e., the Facedancer) and the latter
responds with a bare acknowledgement, this acknowledgement appears within the kernel as
a message whose contents match the original query. Thus, the firewall will report repeated
messages that mirror the preceding message and the Beagle will report empty messages.
2. Some communications span multiple USB packets. These are reported by the Beagle as sepa-
rate, whereas the USB controller on the FreeBSD host reassembles them before they are passed
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(a) Linux test host.




(b) FreeBSD test target.
Table 6.3: Specifications of machines used for performance testing (Section 6.3).
to the kernel for processing. Thus, the record of USB messages seen by the Beagle sometimes
contains, e.g., three messages whose contents, when concatenated, match the corresponding
single message reported by the firewall.
According to my testing, no other discrepancies exist between USB data seen by the Beagle
protocol analyzer and the USB firewall. In light of this analysis, my testing suggests that the USB
firewall I have integrated into FreeBSD satisfies the complete mediation requirement as laid out at
the beginning of this chapter.
6.3 Performance
In addition to being stable and enforcing complete mediation, the firewall must not incur undue
performance penalties. To measure the additional processing time induced by the presence of the
firewall, I again used the umap fuzz-testing feature. I modified umap to produce as little output
as possible and I turned off all logging in the USB firewall. I then ran each test suite three times,
rebooting between each test. I used the time(1) program to measure the duration of each fuzz testing
run. The specifications of the machines I used for this are shown in Table 6.3; the results for each
set of test suite runs are shown in Table 6.4.
These numbers tell a very strange story. For audio control, audio streaming, and mass storage
devices, the penalty incurred by activating the firewall is minimal, whereas the effect on printers is
moderate and the effect on hubs is significant. Yet it is curious that the disparities are so unevenly
spread among device classes; the abysmal performance of the hub class is particularly worrisome.
I investigated this behavior and found that, when the firewall was disabled, FreeBSD noticed
the erroneous value sent by umap and immediately disconnected the device. By contrast, when I
enabled the firewall, the firewall correctly rejected the erroneous frames, but FreeBSD continued to
poll the device twice more, with one second between each attempt, until it gave up and disconnected
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test disabled enabled impact
Audio control 681 s 690 s 1.3%
Audio streaming 681 s 690 s 1.3%
Printer 459 s 526 s 14.5%
Mass Storage 649 s 668 s 2.9%
Hub 338 s 477 s 41.1%
Table 6.4: Results of USB firewall performance tests. Columns show measured duration of fuzz-
testing suite for each device class, averaged over three runs, first with the firewall disabled, then
with the firewall enabled, and the measured impact of enabling the firewall as a percentage.
the device. This mirrors the situation I discovered with human-interface devices (described in
Section 6.1.2).
It is important to note here that the firewall is doing its job! One could argue that, when the
firewall is disabled, FreeBSD is being overzealous in disconnecting the hub immediately on detecting
an error. Alternatively, one could argue that this highlights the need for a more nuanced interface
between firewall and kernel—that the current firewall is too simplistic in its binary choice of either
accept or reject. This work does not attempt to make philosophical judgments along those lines,
but further research into the “correct” abstraction to present seems worthwhile. We note that these
abstractions come to the forefront due to the integration between the firewall and the underlying
operating system—which exposes non-trivial architectural features.
Common-case Performance The previous section describes the minimal overhead incurred when
the firewall is presented with invalid traffic. One hopes, however, that most of the traffic examined
by the firewall will be benign, therefore I also measured the impact of the firewall on legitimate
traffic. I used the singlestreamread workload from the FileBench benchmark suite [60] to measure
throughput of a USB mass storage device. I ran 5 experiment each with the firewall enabled and
disabled. The results are shown in Table 6.5.
Oddly, FileBench reports that performance is better when the firewall is enabled compared to
when it is disabled. The numbers are so close, however, that there is essentially no difference
between the two, and thus I claim that the automagically-generated USB firewall does not incur an
unreasonable performance penalty in the face of legitimate USB traffic.
As a final point relative to performance, I should point out that none of the generated code is the
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operations ops/sec mb/sec ms/op
Firewall disabled 32520 542 538 1.8
Firewall enabled 32725 543 542 1.8
Table 6.5: Results of running FileBench’s singlestreamread workload on a USB mass storage
device, with the firewall enabled and disabled.
least bit optimized. It could almost certainly be made far more efficient. Acceptable performance is
the goal of this proof-of-concept; exceptional performance can come later.
6.4 Effectiveness
The final criteria by which the effectiveness of the firewall should be judged is whether it successfully
prevents “bad” frames from entering the kernel. But what does “bad” mean in this context? Cer-
tainly, we wish to prevent frames that deviate from the protocol specification, but there are other
circumstances to consider as well. What if the kernel incorrectly handles a frame that is correct
according to the specification? Many of the fuzz tests and known-vulnerability tests performed by
umap test precisely this possibility. Furthermore, what if a system administrator wants to prevent,
e.g., thumbdrives from working on a particular machine?
For example, the USB 2.0 specification decrees that device addresses fall within the range 0–127.
Since this is an 8-bit field, a malicious device could conceivably set it to 255 (one of the umap
tests does so) and the kernel should reject it without blinking an eye. Detecting this deviation
seems outside the realm of the parser because it deals with the contents of the field rather than
its boundaries: the specification says the address is an 8-bit field and the parser is (or should be)
responsible for taking 8 bits and making a number out of them. Is is not, however, out of the realm
of a firewall, nor should it be. In fact, it is precisely the purview of the user-policy feature described
in Section 5.3. Thus, to enforce the condition that all device addresses fall within the correct range,
one could create and enable a user policy including the rule
Reject SET_ADDRESS where address > 127
This policy is clearly a mitigation, not a fix for the particular underlying vulnerability. A fix
would eliminate the vulnerability by inserting the check into the operating system code proper;
replacing the kernel of a running system, however, has significant operational costs—not to mention
the inevitable delay of vendor patch releases. Thus, a mitigation that prevents an exploit payload
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from getting to the vulnerable code has great operational value, even though it does not fix the root
problem itself. Firewalls were invented as precisly such mitigation tools. They were followed by
intrustion-prevention systems (IPS) [2], which continue to evolve to this day.
How, then, can one evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation? While certainly useful, the vulnerability-
trigger-based testing enabled by umap and described earlier in this chapter cannot test every possible
codepath for the absence of bugs. Since no exhaustive description or model of all bugs is possible, we
can only evaluate the effects of a particular mitigation—such as a syntax-based filtering policy—in
terms of what we know about the prevalence of bugs in the wild. A useful mitigation should be
able to address non-trivial classes of these bugs. That is to say, we need some indication of ground
truth with respect to bugs in deployed USB software. For this, we must turn to NIST’s National
Vulnerability Database (NVD), which catalogs disclosed vulnerabilities as “Common Vulnerability
and Exposure” (CVE) records.
My method is as follows. Taking the CVE database as the ground truth of USB vulnerabilities in
the wild, I surveyed all reports from the past 10 years (January 2005 through December 2015) that
contained the string “usb” and classified them according to their likely relation to errors in parsing
syntax. I assume that such vulnerabilities can be mitigated by a syntax-based parser/firewall policy
filter while others are unlikely to be so mitigated. My analysis shows that the mitigated class is
certainly non-trivial and likely dominant.
Therefore, for each of these 100 vulnerabilities, I reviewed its details and attempted to categorize
whether and how the USB protection framework I created could protect against it. This is, admit-
tedly, an imprecise exercise: many of the vulnerability disclosures do not provide sufficient detail
to conclusively deduce their cause, which makes it difficult to make substantive claims about them.
Even the disclosures relatively devoid of details provide some hints, however. Table 6.6 summarizes
the five vulnerability categories I settled on and the vulnerabilities I assigned to each.
6.5 Categories
As I read through the vulnerablity disclosure reports, I assigned each to a category indicating how
the USB protection framework described in this dissertation would affect it. I began with a “yes”
or “no” classification but, as I proceeded, I was able to produce more nuanced classes, eventually
resulting in five different categorizations: unrelated, unclear, mitigated by policy, mitigated by design
pattern, and inherently averted.
Appendix A contains tables that list all vulnerabilities in all categories, their summaries, and a
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Class Count Vulnerabilities
Unrelated 45 CVE-2005-2879 CVE-2005-3055 CVE-2005-4417 CVE-2006-2147
CVE-2006-2936 CVE-2006-6441 CVE-2006-6881 CVE-2007-0734
CVE-2007-0822 CVE-2007-2023 CVE-2007-4785 CVE-2007-5093
CVE-2007-5460 CVE-2008-0708 CVE-2008-0951 CVE-2008-2235
CVE-2008-3150 CVE-2008-3605 CVE-2009-0243 CVE-2009-2834
CVE-2010-0103 CVE-2010-0221 CVE-2010-0222 CVE-2010-0223
CVE-2010-0224 CVE-2010-0225 CVE-2010-0226 CVE-2010-0227
CVE-2010-0228 CVE-2010-0229 CVE-2011-1828 CVE-2012-2693
CVE-2012-6314 CVE-2013-1063 CVE-2013-1774 CVE-2013-3666
CVE-2013-5166 CVE-2014-0860 CVE-2014-2388 CVE-2014-5263
CVE-2014-9596 CVE-2015-1319 CVE-2015-3320 CVE-2015-5960
CVE-2015-6520
Unclear 12 CVE-2005-4788 CVE-2007-3513 CVE-2009-0282 CVE-2010-1140
CVE-2010-3542 CVE-2010-4656 CVE-2011-2295 CVE-2013-0981
CVE-2014-7888 CVE-2014-7893 CVE-2014-7894 CVE-2014-7895
Mitigated by
Policy
27 CVE-2005-2388 CVE-2005-4789 CVE-2006-1368 CVE-2007-0728
CVE-2007-6439 CVE-2008-0718 CVE-2009-2807 CVE-2009-2834
CVE-2010-1460 CVE-2010-4530 CVE-2011-0638 CVE-2011-0639
CVE-2011-0640 CVE-2012-4736 CVE-2013-0923 CVE-2013-1860
CVE-2013-2058 CVE-2013-4541 CVE-2013-5192 CVE-2013-5864




3 CVE-2010-1083 CVE-2010-3298 CVE-2010-4074
Inherently
Averted
14 CVE-2006-2935 CVE-2006-4459 CVE-2006-5972 CVE-2008-4680
CVE-2010-0038 CVE-2010-0297 CVE-2011-0712 CVE-2012-3723
CVE-2012-6053 CVE-2013-1285 CVE-2013-1286 CVE-2013-1287
CVE-2013-3200 CVE-2014-8884
Table 6.6: Classification of USB mentions in CVE incident reports into how they might be affected
by the USB firewall I created.
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justification for their categorization.
Unrelated Almost half of the vulnerabilities turned up by the search only incidentally touched on
USB or didn’t relate to data flowing over the bus. For example, CVE-2015-5960 describes an attack
whereby a user can bypass Firefox OS permissions and access attached USB mass storage devices.
This is not a failure to correctly handle data on the bus, but rather a permissions issue elsewhere in
the kernel. Likewise, CVE-2014-5263 describes a failure to correctly terminate a linked list that just
happened to be in the USB code. Table A.1 summarizes the vulnerabilities I classified as Unrelated.
Unclear I was unable to categorize about 10% of the USB-related vulnerabilities in my search.
CVE-2013-0981, for instance, allows kernel pointers to be modified from userspace, but the disclosure
doesn’t say whether the userspace application can be affected by traffic from the USB device. And
in a shining example of transparency, Oracle declines to specify any details in their vulnerability
“disclosures”, as exemplified by CVE-2011-2295. Table A.2 summarizes the vulnerabilities I classified
as Unclear.
Mitigated by Policy I concluded that nearly one-third of the vulnerabilities could be mitigated
by policy. That is, one could write a policy rule that would prevent the USB traffic that exploits
the bug. For instance, CVE-2015-7833 is tickled “via a nonzero bInterfaceNumber value in a USB
device descriptor”; to prevent such a descriptor from reaching the vulnerable code, one could write
a rule that matches device descriptors with a bInterfaceNumber field of zero and, upon a match,
rejects the device. Another vulnerability, CVE-2013-5192, is triggered when the USB hub controller
in OS X is presented with a request containing a particularly-crafted port number; in this case, one
could write a rule that matches and rejects requests with that port number. Table A.3 summarizes
the vulnerabilities I classified as Mitigated by Policy.
Mitigated by Design Pattern Three vulnerabilities resulted from deviations from sound pro-
gramming practices; when sound practices are encoded once in the autogeneration code, such bugs
disappear everywhere. Instances include failure to properly initialize structure members (CVE-
2010-3298 and CVE-2010-4074) and failure to clear transfer buffers before returning to userspace
(CVE-2010-1083). Table A.4 summarizes the vulnerabilities I classified as Mitigated by Design
Pattern.
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Inherently Averted Finally, almost 15% of the vulnerabilities were due to mistakes in interpret-
ing the structure of the USB messages themselves. Most of these were either buffer overflows that
resulted in arbitrary code execution or memory corruption. In both cases, I assumed (dangerously,
I know) that some field of the USB descriptor indicating a length did not match the actual length of
data provided in the packet. In the generated enforcement code, as long as the original specification
of the message is correct, this cannot happen: if one field specifies the length of another, this is
verified. Table A.5 summarizes the vulnerabilities I classified as Inherently Averted.
6.6 Results
Of all the vulnerabilities I analyzed, the three categories that bear discussion are those that are
inherently averted, those that are mitigated by pattern, and those that are mitigated by policy. I
discuss each in turn.
The inherently-averted vulnerabilities are the most straightforward: by clearly defining the struc-
ture of messages and dependencies between fields (e.g., that the data stage has a length equal to
the value of the “wLength” field) and automagically generating the code to enforce them, an entire
class of vulnerabilities can be avoided. The autogeneration code only needs to be audited once and
all the generated code can be trusted (especially if it is formally verified), whereas the trustworthi-
ness of manually-written code scattered throughout the kernel is anybody’s guess. Furthermore, the
declarative nature of the protocol specification language makes auditing much easier than having to
dig through procedural code, not least because it more directly matches the form of the published
(prose) specification.
My favorite class is the vulnerabilities mitigated by pattern, because here the autogeneration code
enshrines good programming practices into the autogeneration framework and thus ensures their
proliferation. By causing the autogenerated code to always clear buffers beforehand (for example)
then we can depend on buffers to not contain crufty data that might interfere with the computation
at hand. Additionally, should new, better practices be developed, we need only incorporate them into
the autogeneration framework, regenerate and recompile the code, and suddenly every applicable
instance that could be improved, has been improved.
Vulnerabilities mitigated by policy are perhaps the trickiest to appreciate. At first blush, it seems
they are not terribly noteworthy: why is being able to write a policy that protects against a vulner-
ability superior to just fixing the vulnerability itself? The answer lies in practical issues surrounding
patching live systems. Distributing and activating a single policy rule to enable protection is much
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less disruptive than shipping a newly-compiled binary (still less a kernel binary!) containing the fix.
All told, these three classes of vulnerabilities—all of which are addressed, one way or another, by
the autogenerated code presented in this dissertation—make up nearly half of all the USB-related
vulnerabilities I found in my search, even accounting for the fact that many of the “unrelated”
vulnerabilities only coincidentally mentioned USB.
6.7 Summary
This chapter described the results of evaluating my generated parser/firewall in terms of stability,
performance costs, ability to mediate malicious traffic, and potential to mitigate USB bugs in the
wild (based on the available CVE information). My evaluation, conducted with the state-of-the-art
USB security testing suite umap, empirically demonstrates both stability, complete mediation, and
reasonable performance for all vulnerability triggers and trigger classes known to date. Additionally,
an analysis of available CVE information suggests that large non-trivial classes of bugs in the wild
can indeed be mitigated with simple and—importantly—easy to deploy user-defined policies for
the firewall. Notably, these mitigations can be deployed immediately and simply on systems which
integrate such a firewall, in stark contrast to vendor patches which must be written and tested, and




This thesis described the methodology by which I produced a parser/firewall for the USB protocol
and integrated it with the FreeBSD operating system, as well as the support software I wrote and
explorations I performed leading up to the production of the automagically generated parser/firewall
system.
I began with a presentation of the software I wrote to drive the Facedancer board that enables
the exploration of USB attack surfaces (Chapter 3). This software mirrors the structure of the USB
stack itself and is therefore easier to adapt to new uses, which is a vital feature for exploring attack
surfaces. Additionally, the software I wrote was used as the basis for umap, the industry-standard
test suite for analyzing the security of USB hosts.
Next, I described the instrumentation framework I applied to the USB subsystem of the FreeBSD
kernel (Chapter 4), which allows for observation of a running system at an unprecedented granularity.
I showed how I used this framework to measure what percentage of basic blocks were traversed under
normal system operation, how I used it to identify where to place enforcement hooks, and how to
analyze interactions between software modules.
Then, I presented the methodology I developed to create the USB parser/firewall (Chapter 5).
I began with a description of the protocol written in Haskell and automagically generated the data
structures, validation functions, printing functions, and accessor functions necessary in a parser for
that protocol. I integrated these all into FreeBSD’s existing USB stack with the help of a thin
translation layer—the idea being that integrating with a different operating system would require
only a different translation layer.
I used umap, the comprehensive USB security testing suite, to empirically evaluate the stability,
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peformance, and efficacy of my parser/firewall (Chapter 6). I showed that every frame sent by umap
was evaluated by the firewall, that the firewall never crashed, and that it was able to handle a variety
of user-specified policies. These user policies allow an administrator to respond much more quickly
to security issues in the underlying system than the normal process of waiting for and deploying a
vendor patch. I showed that, through a combination of beneficial design patterns and user policies,
it is likely that a large quantity of known USB bugs are mitigated by my parser/firewall. More
importantly, I showed how these features of my parser/firewall mitigate entire classes of bugs as
delineated by industry-standard testing tools and processes.
7.1 Future Work
There are a number of directions this work could take from here.
First and foremost, I would like to apply the full seL4-style formal verification process to the
autogenerated code. Once that is complete, I would like to work towards getting the code accepted
by the FreeBSD kernel maintainers. Additionally, I would like to perform more rigorous testing
for complete mediation. (Sadly, the Saturn project [1] for Linux does not have a FreeBSD analog;
perhaps that would make a good research project.)
While the Facedancer software framework I wrote is clearly useful—as evidenced by umap built
on it—I would like to investigate the feasibility of autogenerating that as well. The basic-block in-
strumentation I added to the FreeBSD kernel was tedious and screamed for automation: I would like




This appendix contains the results of my USB-related CVE classification. There is one table for
each classification category: unrelated, unclear, mitigated by policy, mitigated by design pattern,
and inherently averted. Each table lists the CVE identifier, the official summary, and the reason I
chose to classify it as I did.
Rather than provide citations for each individual CVE, the reader is referred to the main portal
for the National Vulnerability Database [59], whence once can search for any CVE.
Table A.1: Vulnerabilities classified as Unrelated.
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2010-1460 The IBM BladeCenter with Advanced
Management Module (AMM) firmware be-
fore bpet50g does not properly perform in-
terrupt sharing for USB and iSCSI, which
allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
service (management module reboot) via
TCP packets with malformed application
data.
hardware interrupts are be-




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2007-0728 Unspecified vulnerability in Apple Mac OS
X 10.3.9 and 10.4 through 10.4.8 creates
files insecurely while initializing a USB
printer, which allows local users to create
or overwrite arbitrary files.
seems unrelated, unless “lo-
cal user” means “someone
who can insert a potentially-
malicious USB device”, in
which case this could likely be
averted by policy
CVE-2013-0981 The IOUSBDeviceFamily driver in the
USB implementation in the kernel in Ap-
ple iOS before 6.1.3 and Apple TV be-
fore 5.2.1 accesses pipe object pointers that
originated in userspace, which allows local
users to gain privileges via crafted code.
seems related to userland
code rather than data arriv-
ing over USB
CVE-2014-7888 The OLE Point of Sale (OPOS) drivers be-
fore 1.13.003 on HP Point of Sale Win-
dows PCs allow remote attackers to ex-
ecute arbitrary code via vectors involv-
ing OPOSMICR.ocx for PUSB Thermal
Receipt printers, SerialUSB Thermal Re-
ceipt printers, Hybrid POS printers with
MICR, Value PUSB Receipt printers, and
Value Serial/USB Receipt printers, aka
ZDI-CAN-2512.
seems related to other kernel




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2014-7893 The OLE Point of Sale (OPOS) drivers be-
fore 1.13.003 on HP Point of Sale Win-
dows PCs allow remote attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary code via vectors involving
OPOSCheckScanner.ocx for PUSB Ther-
mal Receipt printers, SerialUSB Thermal
Receipt printers, Hybrid POS printers with
MICR, Value PUSB Receipt printers, and
Value Serial/USB Receipt printers, aka
ZDI-CAN-2507.
seems related to other kernel
drivers rather than data ar-
riving over USB
CVE-2014-7894 The OLE Point of Sale (OPOS) drivers be-
fore 1.13.003 on HP Point of Sale Win-
dows PCs allow remote attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary code via vectors involving
OPOSPOSPrinter.ocx for PUSB Thermal
Receipt printers, SerialUSB Thermal Re-
ceipt printers, Hybrid POS printers with
MICR, Value PUSB Receipt printers, and
Value Serial/USB Receipt printers, aka
ZDI-CAN-2506.
seems related to other kernel




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2014-7895 The OLE Point of Sale (OPOS) drivers be-
fore 1.13.003 on HP Point of Sale Win-
dows PCs allow remote attackers to ex-
ecute arbitrary code via vectors involv-
ing OPOSCashDrawer.ocx for PUSB Ther-
mal Receipt printers, SerialUSB Ther-
mal Receipt printers, Hybrid POS printers
with MICR, Value PUSB Receipt print-
ers, Value Serial/USB Receipt printers,
and USB Standard Duty cash drawers, aka
ZDI-CAN-2505.
seems related to other kernel
drivers rather than data ar-
riving over USB
CVE-2005-2879 Advansysperu Software USB Lock Auto-
Protect (AP) 1.5 uses a weak encryption
scheme to encrypt passwords, which allows
local users to gain sensitive information
and bypass USB interface protection.
encryption is orthogonal to
parsing
CVE-2005-3055 Linux kernel 2.6.8 to 2.6.14-rc2 allows lo-
cal users to cause a denial of service (kernel
OOPS) via a userspace process that issues
a USB Request Block (URB) to a USB de-
vice and terminates before the URB is fin-
ished, which leads to a stale pointer refer-
ence.




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2005-4417 The default configuration of Widcomm
Bluetooth for Windows (BTW) 4.0.1.1500
and earlier, as installed on Belkin
Bluetooth Software 1.4.2 Build 10 and
ANYCOM Blue USB-130-250 Software
4.0.1.1500, and possibly other devices, sets
null Authentication and Authorization val-
ues, which allows remote attackers to send
arbitrary audio and possibly eavesdrop us-
ing the microphone via the Hands Free Au-
dio Gateway and Headset profile.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2006-2147 resmgrd in resmgr for SUSE Linux and
other distributions does not properly han-
dle when access to a USB device is granted
by using “usb:<bus>,<dev>” notation,
which grants access to all USB devices and
allows local users to bypass intended re-
strictions. NOTE: this is a different vul-
nerability than CVE-2005-4788.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2006-2936 The ftdi sio driver (usb/serial/ftdi sio.c) in
Linux kernel 2.6.x up to 2.6.17, and pos-
sibly later versions, allows local users to
cause a denial of service (memory con-
sumption) by writing more data to the se-
rial port than the hardware can handle,
which causes the data to be queued.




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2006-6441 Xerox WorkCentre and WorkCentre
Pro before 12.050.03.000, 13.x be-
fore 13.050.03.000, and 14.x before
14.050.03.000 allows local users to by-
pass security controls and boot Alchemy
via certain alternate boot media, as
demonstrated by a USB thumb drive.
system misconfiguration is
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2007-0822 umount, when running with the Linux
2.6.15 kernel on Slackware Linux 10.2, al-
lows local users to trigger a NULL derefer-
ence and application crash by invoking the
program with a pathname for a USB pen
drive that was mounted and then physi-
cally removed, which might allow the users
to obtain sensitive information, including
core file contents.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2007-0734 fsck, as used by the AirPort Disk feature
of the AirPort Extreme Base Station with
802.11n before Firmware Update 7.1, and
by Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 through 10.4.9,
does not properly enforce password protec-
tion of a USB hard drive, which allows
context-dependent attackers to list arbi-
trary directories or execute arbitrary code,
resulting from memory corruption.




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2007-2023 USB20.dll in Secustick USB flash drive de-
couples the authorization and file access
routines, which allows local users to by-
pass authentication requirements by alter-
ing the return value of the VerifyPassWord
function.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2007-5460 Microsoft ActiveSync 4.1, as used in Win-
dows Mobile 5.0, uses weak encryption
(XOR obfuscation with a fixed key) when
sending the user’s PIN/Password over the
USB connection from the host to the de-
vice, which might make it easier for attack-
ers to decode a PIN/Password obtained by
(1) sniffing or (2) spoofing the docking pro-
cess.
encryption is orthogonal to
parsing
CVE-2015-6520 IPPUSBXD before 1.22 listens on all inter-
faces, which allows remote attackers to ob-
tain access to USB connected printers via
a direct request.
vulnerability is in IP-related
driver, not USB
CVE-2015-1319 The Unity Settings Daemon before
14.04.0+14.04.20150825-0ubuntu2 and
15.04.x before 15.04.1+15.04.20150408-
0ubuntu1.2 does not properly detect if the
screen is locked, which allows physically
proximate attackers to mount remov-
able media while the screen is locked as
demonstrated by inserting a USB thumb
drive.
USB used for POC, vulnera-




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2015-5960 Mozilla Firefox OS before 2.2 allows phys-
ically proximate attackers to bypass the
pass-code protection mechanism and ac-
cess USB Mass Storage (UMS) media vol-
umes by using the USB interface for a
mount operation.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2015-3320 Lenovo USB Enhanced Performance Key-
board software before 2.0.2.2 includes ac-
tive debugging code in SKHOOKS.DLL,
which allows local users to obtain keypress
information by accessing debug output.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2014-9596 Panasonic Arbitrator Back-End Server
(BES) MK 2.0 VPU before 9.3.1 build
4.08.003.0, when USB Wi-Fi or Direct
LAN is enabled, and MK 3.0 VPU be-
fore 9.3.1 build 5.06.000.0, when Embed-
ded Wi-Fi or Direct LAN is enabled, does
not use encryption, which allows remote
attackers to obtain sensitive information
by sniffing the network for client-server
traffic, as demonstrated by Active Direc-
tory credential information.
encryption is orthogonal to
parsing
CVE-2013-5166 The Bluetooth USB host controller in Ap-
ple Mac OS X before 10.9 prematurely
deletes interfaces, which allows local users
to cause a denial of service (system crash)
via a crafted application.
“crafted application” implies
userland, not USB device
Cont’d
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Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2012-4736 The Device Encryption Client component
in Sophos SafeGuard Enterprise 6.0, when
a volume-based encryption policy is en-
abled in conjunction with a user-defined
key, does not properly block use of exFAT
USB flash drives, which makes it easier for
local users to bypass intended access re-
strictions and copy sensitive information to
a drive via multiple removal and reattach
operations.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2013-4541 The usb device post load function in
hw/usb/bus.c in QEMU before 1.7.2
might allow remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code via a crafted savevm
image, related to a negative setup len or
setup index value.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2014-3461 hw/usb/bus.c in QEMU 1.6.2 allows re-
mote attackers to execute arbitrary code
via crafted savevm data, which triggers
a heap-based buffer overflow, related to
“USB post load checks.”




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2007-5093 The disconnect method in the Philips USB
Webcam (pwc) driver in Linux kernel 2.6.x
before 2.6.22.6 “relies on user space to close
the device,” which allows user-assisted lo-
cal attackers to cause a denial of service
(USB subsystem hang and CPU consump-
tion in khubd) by not closing the device af-
ter the disconnect is invoked. NOTE: this
rarely crosses privilege boundaries, unless
the attacker can convince the victim to un-
plug the affected device.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2008-2235 OpenSC before 0.11.5 uses weak permis-
sions (ADMIN file control information of
00) for the 5015 directory on smart cards
and USB crypto tokens running Siemens
CardOS M4, which allows physically prox-
imate attackers to change the PIN.
filesystem permissions are or-
thogonal to parsing
CVE-2008-3605 Unspecified vulnerability in McAfee En-
crypted USB Manager 3.1.0.0, when the
Re-use Threshold for passwords is nonzero,
allows remote attackers to conduct offline
brute force attacks via unknown vectors.
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CVE-2010-0221 Kingston DataTraveler BlackBox (DTBB),
DataTraveler Secure Privacy Edition
(DTSP), and DataTraveler Elite Privacy
Edition (DTEP) USB flash drives validate
passwords with a program running on
the host computer rather than the device
hardware, which allows physically prox-
imate attackers to access the cleartext
drive contents via a modified program.
user password validation is
orthogonal to parsing
CVE-2010-0222 Kingston DataTraveler BlackBox (DTBB),
DataTraveler Secure Privacy Edition
(DTSP), and DataTraveler Elite Privacy
Edition (DTEP) USB flash drives use a
fixed 256-bit key for obtaining access to
the cleartext drive contents, which makes
it easier for physically proximate attackers
to read or modify data by determining
and providing this key.
encryption is orthogonal to
parsing
CVE-2010-0223 Kingston DataTraveler BlackBox (DTBB),
DataTraveler Secure Privacy Edition
(DTSP), and DataTraveler Elite Privacy
Edition (DTEP) USB flash drives do not
prevent password replay attacks, which
allows physically proximate attackers to
access the cleartext drive contents by
providing a key that was captured in a
USB data stream at an earlier time.
authentication is orthogonal
to parsing (though a user pol-
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CVE-2010-0224 SanDisk Cruzer Enterprise USB flash
drives validate passwords with a program
running on the host computer rather than
the device hardware, which allows phys-
ically proximate attackers to access the
cleartext drive contents via a modified pro-
gram.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2010-0225 SanDisk Cruzer Enterprise USB flash
drives use a fixed 256-bit key for obtain-
ing access to the cleartext drive contents,
which makes it easier for physically proxi-
mate attackers to read or modify data by
determining and providing this key.
poor encryption implementa-
tions are orthogonal to USB
CVE-2010-0226 SanDisk Cruzer Enterprise USB flash
drives do not prevent password replay at-
tacks, which allows physically proximate
attackers to access the cleartext drive con-
tents by providing a key that was captured
in a USB data stream at an earlier time.
authentication is orthogonal
to parsing (though a user pol-
icy might be able to thwart
this particular attack)
CVE-2008-3150 Directory traversal vulnerability in in-
dex.php in Neutrino Atomic Edition 0.8.4
allows remote attackers to read and mod-
ify files, as demonstrated by manipulating
data/sess.php in (1) usb and (2) del pag
actions. NOTE: this can be leveraged for
code execution by performing an upload
that bypasses the intended access restric-
tions that were implemented in sess.php.
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CVE-2010-0227 Verbatim Corporate Secure and Corporate
Secure FIPS Edition USB flash drives vali-
date passwords with a program running on
the host computer rather than the device
hardware, which allows physically proxi-
mate attackers to access the cleartext drive
contents via a modified program.
user authentication is orthog-
onal to USB
CVE-2010-0228 Verbatim Corporate Secure and Corporate
Secure FIPS Edition USB flash drives use
a fixed 256-bit key for obtaining access to
the cleartext drive contents, which makes
it easier for physically proximate attackers
to read or modify data by determining and
providing this key.
encryption is orthogonal to
USB
CVE-2010-0229 Verbatim Corporate Secure and Corporate
Secure FIPS Edition USB flash drives do
not prevent password replay attacks, which
allows physically proximate attackers to
access the cleartext drive contents by pro-
viding a key that was captured in a USB
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CVE-2014-2388 The Storage and Access service in Black-
Berry OS 10.x before 10.2.1.1925 on Q5,
Q10, Z10, and Z30 devices does not en-
force the password requirement for SMB
filesystem access, which allows context-
dependent attackers to read arbitrary files
via (1) a session over a Wi-Fi network or
(2) a session over a USB connection in De-
velopment Mode.
user authentication is orthog-
onal to USB
CVE-2012-6314 Citrix XenDesktop Virtual Desktop Agent
(VDA) 5.6.x before 5.6.200, when making
changes to the server-side policy that con-
trol USB redirection, does not propagate
changes to the VDA, which allows authen-
ticated users to retain access to the USB
device.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2011-1828 usb-creator-helper in usb-creator before
0.2.28.3 does not enforce intended Poli-
cyKit restrictions, which allows local users
to perform arbitrary unmount operations
via the UnmountFile method in a dbus-
send command.
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CVE-2012-2693 libvirt, possibly before 0.9.12, does not
properly assign USB devices to virtual ma-
chines when multiple devices have the same
vendor and product ID, which might cause
the wrong device to be associated with a
guest and might allow local users to access
unintended USB devices.
unrelated to syntax of USB
messages (and USB stack by
design can’t know enough to
handle this)
CVE-2013-3666 The LG Hidden Menu component for An-
droid on the LG Optimus G E973 al-
lows physically proximate attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary commands by entering USB
Debugging mode, using Android Debug
Bridge (adb) to establish a USB con-
nection, dialing 3845#*973#, modifying
the WLAN Test Wi-Fi Ping Test/User
Command tcpdump command string, and
pressing the CANCEL button.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2013-1063 usb-creator 0.2.47 before 0.2.47.1, 0.2.40
before 0.2.40ubuntu2, and 0.2.38 before
0.2.38.2 does not properly use D-Bus for
communication with a polkit authority,
which allows local users to bypass intended
access restrictions by leveraging a Polki-
tUnixProcess PolkitSubject race condition
via a (1) setuid process or (2) pkexec pro-
cess, a related issue to CVE-2013-4288.
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CVE-2013-1774 The chase port function in drivers/usb/se-
rial/io ti.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.4
allows local users to cause a denial of ser-
vice (NULL pointer dereference and sys-
tem crash) via an attempted /dev/ttyUSB
read or write operation on a disconnected
Edgeport USB serial converter.
possibly preventable by de-
sign pattern, but otherwise
an issue of kernel logic unre-
lated to the USB protocol it-
self
CVE-2010-0103 UsbCharger.dll in the Energizer DUO
USB battery charger software con-
tains a backdoor that is implemented
through the Arucer.dll file in the
%WINDIR%\system32 directory, which
allows remote attackers to download
arbitrary programs onto a Windows PC,
and execute these programs, via a request
to TCP port 7777.
unrelated to data arriving
over USB
CVE-2014-0860 The firmware before 3.66E in IBM Blade-
Center Advanced Management Module
(AMM), the firmware before 1.43 in IBM
Integrated Management Module (IMM),
and the firmware before 4.15 in IBM In-
tegrated Management Module II (IMM2)
contains cleartext IPMI credentials, which
allows attackers to execute arbitrary IPMI
commands, and consequently establish a
blade remote-control session, by leveraging
access to (1) the chassis internal network or
(2) the Ethernet-over-USB interface.




Table A.1 – Cont’d
CVE ID Summary Justification
Table A.2: Vulnerabilities classified as Unclear.
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2008-0718 Unspecified vulnerability in the USB
Mouse STREAMS module (usbms) in Sun
Solaris 9 and 10, when 64-bit mode is en-
abled, allows local users to cause a denial
of service (panic) via unspecified vectors.
not enough detail
CVE-2009-2807 Heap-based buffer overflow in the USB
backend in CUPS in Apple Mac OS X
10.5.8 allows local users to gain privileges
via unspecified vectors.
not enough detail
CVE-2013-0923 The USB Apps API in Google Chrome be-
fore 26.0.1410.43 allows remote attackers
to cause a denial of service (memory cor-
ruption) via unspecified vectors.
not enough detail
CVE-2013-5864 Unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Solaris
10 and 11.1 allows local users to affect
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CVE-2013-2058 The host start function in drivers/us-
b/chipidea/host.c in the Linux kernel be-
fore 3.7.4 does not properly support a cer-
tain non-streaming option, which allows lo-
cal users to cause a denial of service (sys-
tem crash) by sending a large amount of
network traffic through a USB/Ethernet
adapter.
firewall could potentially per-
form rate-limiting, but does
not currently
CVE-2014-3185 Multiple buffer overflows in the com-
mand port read callback function in
drivers/usb/serial/whiteheat.c in the
Whiteheat USB Serial Driver in the
Linux kernel before 3.16.2 allow physically
proximate attackers to execute arbitrary
code or cause a denial of service (memory
corruption and system crash) via a crafted
device that provides a large amount of (1)
EHCI or (2) XHCI data associated with a
bulk response.
firewall could potentially per-
form rate-limiting, but does
not currently
CVE-2005-4788 resmgr in SUSE Linux 9.2 and 9.3, and
possibly other distributions, allows local
users to bypass access control rules for USB
devices via “alternate syntax for specifying
USB devices.”
not sure if caused by data
from USB device or not
Cont’d
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CVE-2007-3513 The lcd write function in drivers/usb/mis-
c/usblcd.c in the Linux kernel before
2.6.22-rc7 does not limit the amount of
memory used by a caller, which allows local
users to cause a denial of service (memory
consumption).
not sure if caused by data
from USB device or not
CVE-2009-0282 Integer overflow in Ralink Technology USB
wireless adapter (RT73) 3.08 for Windows,
and other wireless card drivers including
rt2400, rt2500, rt2570, and rt61, allows re-
mote attackers to cause a denial of service
(crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code
via a Probe Request packet with a long
SSID, possibly related to an integer signed-
ness error.
not sure if caused by data at
USB protocol level or appli-
cation level
CVE-2010-1140 The USB service in VMware Workstation
7.0 before 7.0.1 build 227600 and VMware
Player 3.0 before 3.0.1 build 227600 on
Windows might allow host OS users to gain
privileges by placing a Trojan horse pro-
gram at an unspecified location on the host
OS disk.
not sure if triggered by USB
data
CVE-2010-3542 Unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Solaris
8, 9, and 10, and OpenSolaris, allows lo-
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CVE-2011-2295 Unspecified vulnerability in Oracle So-
laris 8, 9, 10, and 11 Express allows lo-
cal users to affect availability, related to
Driver/USB.
not enough detail
CVE-2007-6439 Wireshark (formerly Ethereal) 0.99.6 al-
lows remote attackers to cause a denial
of service (infinite or large loop) via the
(1) IPv6 or (2) USB dissector, which can
trigger resource consumption or a crash.
NOTE: this identifier originally included
Firebird/Interbase, but it is already cov-
ered by CVE-2007-6116. The DCP ETSI
issue is already covered by CVE-2007-6119.
seems descriptor-related, but
not enough information
Table A.3: Vulnerabilities classified as Mitigated By Policy.
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2006-4459 Integer overflow in AnywhereUSB/5
1.80.00 allows local users to cause a denial
of service (crash) via a 1 byte header size
specified in the USB string descriptor.
user policy: “reject message
where length ¿ x”
Cont’d
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CVE-2012-3723 Apple Mac OS X before 10.7.5 does not
properly handle the bNbrPorts field of a
USB hub descriptor, which allows phys-
ically proximate attackers to execute ar-
bitrary code or cause a denial of service
(memory corruption and system crash) by
attaching a USB device.
user policy: “reject message
where bNbrPorts == bad
value”
CVE-2012-6053 epan/dissectors/packet-usb.c in the USB
dissector in Wireshark 1.6.x before 1.6.12
and 1.8.x before 1.8.4 relies on a length
field to calculate an offset value, which al-
lows remote attackers to cause a denial of
service (infinite loop) via a zero value for
this field.
user policy: “reject message
where length == 0”
CVE-2005-4789 resmgr in SUSE Linux 9.2 and 9.3, and
possibly other distributions, does not prop-
erly enforce class-specific exclude rules in
some situations, which allows local users
to bypass intended access restrictions for
USB devices that set their class ID at the
interface level.
user policy: “Reject inter-
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CVE-2010-4530 Signedness error in ccid serial.c in libccid
in the USB Chip/Smart Card Interface De-
vices (CCID) driver, as used in pcscd in
PCSC-Lite 1.5.3 and possibly other prod-
ucts, allows physically proximate attackers
to execute arbitrary code via a smart card
with a crafted serial number that causes
a negative value to be used in a memcpy
operation, which triggers a buffer overflow.
NOTE: some sources refer to this issue as
an integer overflow.
user policy: “Reject de-
vice descriptor where se-
rial number = xyz”
CVE-2011-0638 Microsoft Windows does not properly warn
the user before enabling additional Hu-
man Interface Device (HID) functionality
over USB, which allows user-assisted at-
tackers to execute arbitrary programs via
crafted USB data, as demonstrated by key-
board and mouse data sent by malware on
a smartphone that the user connected to
the computer.
user policy: “reject message
where data contains abc”
Cont’d
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CVE-2011-0639 Apple Mac OS X does not properly warn
the user before enabling additional Hu-
man Interface Device (HID) functionality
over USB, which allows user-assisted at-
tackers to execute arbitrary programs via
crafted USB data, as demonstrated by key-
board and mouse data sent by malware on
a smartphone that the user connected to
the computer.
user policy: “reject message
where data contains abc”
CVE-2011-0640 The default configuration of udev on Linux
does not warn the user before enabling
additional Human Interface Device (HID)
functionality over USB, which allows user-
assisted attackers to execute arbitrary pro-
grams via crafted USB data, as demon-
strated by keyboard and mouse data sent
by malware on a smartphone that the user
connected to the computer.
user policy: “reject message
where data contains abc”
CVE-2013-1860 Heap-based buffer overflow in
the wdm in callback function in
drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the
Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically
proximate attackers to cause a denial of
service (system crash) or possibly execute
arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB
device.
not enough detail, but likely
user policy to prevent mali-
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CVE-2013-5192 The USB hub controller in Apple Mac OS
X before 10.9 allows local users to cause a
denial of service (system crash) via a re-
quest with a crafted (1) port or (2) port
number.
user policy: “reject message
where port == abc”
CVE-2014-1287 USB Host in Apple iOS before 7.1 and Ap-
ple TV before 6.1 allows physically prox-
imate attackers to execute arbitrary code
or cause a denial of service (memory cor-
ruption) via crafted USB messages.
user policy to reject
particularly-crafted mes-
sages
CVE-2015-5257 drivers/usb/serial/whiteheat.c in the
Linux kernel before 4.2.4 allows physically
proximate attackers to cause a denial of
service (NULL pointer dereference and
OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other
impact via a crafted USB device.
user policy to reject
particularly-crafted mes-
sages
CVE-2007-4785 Sony Micro Vault Fingerprint Access Soft-
ware, as distributed with Sony Micro Vault
USM-F USB flash drives, installs a driver
that hides a directory under %WINDIR%,
which might allow remote attackers to by-
pass malware detection by placing files in
this directory.
user policy: “reject de-
vice descriptor where prod-
uct id == 123”
Cont’d
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CVE-2008-0708 HP USB 2.0 Floppy Drive Key product op-
tions (1) 442084-B21 and (2) 442085-B21
for certain HP ProLiant servers contain the
(a) W32.Fakerecy and (b) W32.SillyFDC
worms, which might be launched if the
server does not have up-to-date detection.
user policy: “reject de-
vice descriptor where prod-
uct id == 123”
CVE-2009-2834 IOKit in Apple Mac OS X before 10.6.2
allows local users to modify the firmware
of a (1) USB or (2) Bluetooth keyboard
via unspecified vectors.
user policy to prevent offend-
ing outgoing message (though
firewall does not currently fil-
ter outgoing traffic)
CVE-2014-4115 fastfat.sys (aka the FASTFAT driver) in
the kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Win-
dows Server 2003 SP2, Vista SP2, and
Server 2008 SP2 does not properly allocate
memory, which allows physically proxi-
mate attackers to execute arbitrary code or
cause a denial of service (reserved-memory
write) by connecting a crafted USB de-
vice, aka “Microsoft Windows Disk Parti-
tion Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnera-
bility.”
user policy to reject
particularly-crafted mes-
sages
CVE-2015-7833 The usbvision driver in the Linux kernel
package 3.10.0-123.20.1.el7 through 3.10.0-
229.14.1.el7 in Red Hat Enterprise Linux
(RHEL) 7.1 allows physically proximate
attackers to cause a denial of service
(panic) via a nonzero bInterfaceNumber
value in a USB device descriptor.
user policy: “reject de-
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CVE-2008-0951 Microsoft Windows Vista does not prop-
erly enforce the NoDriveTypeAutoRun
registry value, which allows user-assisted
remote attackers, and possibly physically
proximate attackers, to execute arbitrary
code by inserting a (1) CD-ROM device
or (2) U3-enabled USB device containing
a filesystem with an Autorun.inf file, and
possibly other vectors related to (a) Au-
toRun and (b) AutoPlay actions.
user policy to prevent certain
file requests
CVE-2015-1769 Mount Manager in Microsoft Windows
Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and
R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Win-
dows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and
R2, Windows RT Gold and 8.1, and Win-
dows 10 mishandles symlinks, which al-
lows physically proximate attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary code by connecting a crafted
USB device, aka “Mount Manager Eleva-
tion of Privilege Vulnerability.”
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CVE-2009-0243 Microsoft Windows does not properly en-
force the Autorun and NoDriveTypeAu-
toRun registry values, which allows physi-
cally proximate attackers to execute arbi-
trary code by (1) inserting CD-ROM me-
dia, (2) inserting DVD media, (3) connect-
ing a USB device, and (4) connecting a
Firewire device; (5) allows user-assisted re-
mote attackers to execute arbitrary code
by mapping a network drive; and allows
user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary
code by clicking on (6) an icon under My
Computer\Devices with Removable Stor-
age and (7) an option in an AutoPlay dia-
log, related to the Autorun.inf file. NOTE:
vectors 1 and 3 on Vista are already cov-
ered by CVE-2008-0951.
user policy to prevent certain
file requests
CVE-2010-4656 The iowarrior write function in drivers/us-
b/misc/iowarrior.c in the Linux kernel be-
fore 2.6.37 does not properly allocate mem-
ory, which might allow local users to trig-
ger a heap-based buffer overflow, and con-
sequently cause a denial of service or gain
privileges, via a long report.
user policy: “reject re-
port descriptor where length
¿ x” or possibly mitigated
by design pattern, in which
memory allocations are made
in a principled fashion
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Table A.4: Vulnerabilities classified as Mitigated By Pattern.
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CVE-2010-1083 The processcompl compat function in
drivers/usb/core/devio.c in Linux kernel
2.6.x through 2.6.32, and possibly other
versions, does not clear the transfer buffer
before returning to userspace when a USB
command fails, which might make it eas-
ier for physically proximate attackers to
obtain sensitive information (kernel mem-
ory).
principled buffer use would be
encoded into autogeneration
CVE-2010-4074 The USB subsystem in the Linux kernel
before 2.6.36-rc5 does not properly initial-
ize certain structure members, which al-
lows local users to obtain potentially sen-
sitive information from kernel stack mem-
ory via vectors related to TIOCGICOUNT
ioctl calls, and the (1) mos7720 ioctl func-
tion in drivers/usb/serial/mos7720.c and
(2) mos7840 ioctl function in drivers/us-
b/serial/mos7840.c.
principled buffer use would be
encoded into autogeneration
CVE-2010-3298 The hso get count function in driver-
s/net/usb/hso.c in the Linux kernel before
2.6.36-rc5 does not properly initialize a cer-
tain structure member, which allows local
users to obtain potentially sensitive infor-
mation from kernel stack memory via a TI-
OCGICOUNT ioctl call.
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CVE-2014-5263 vmstate xhci event in hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
in QEMU 1.6.0 does not terminate the
list with the VMSTATE END OF LIST
macro, which allows attackers to cause a
denial of service (out-of-bounds access, in-
finite loop, and memory corruption) and
possibly gain privileges via unspecified vec-
tors.
principled data structure use
would be encoded into auto-
generation
Table A.5: Vulnerabilities classified as Inherently Averted.
CVE ID Summary Justification
CVE-2006-2935 The dvd read bca function in the DVD
handling code in drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c in
Linux kernel 2.2.16, and later versions, as-
signs the wrong value to a length variable,
which allows local users to execute arbi-
trary code via a crafted USB Storage de-
vice that triggers a buffer overflow.
length variables are encoded
as strictly dependent on other
values
CVE-2006-5972 Stack-based buffer overflow in
WG111v2.SYS in NetGear WG111v2
wireless adapter (USB) allows remote
attackers to execute arbitrary code via a
long 802.11 beacon request.
frame lengths automatically
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CVE-2008-4680 packet-usb.c in the USB dissector in Wire-
shark 0.99.7 through 1.0.3 allows remote
attackers to cause a denial of service (ap-
plication crash or abort) via a malformed
USB Request Block (URB).
malformed data is automati-
cally rejected
CVE-2010-0038 Recovery Mode in Apple iPhone OS 1.0
through 3.1.2, and iPhone OS for iPod
touch 1.1 through 3.1.2, allows physically
proximate attackers to bypass device lock-
ing, and read or modify arbitrary data, via




by checking packet length,
which is built in
CVE-2010-0297 Buffer overflow in the
usb host handle control function in
the USB passthrough handling imple-
mentation in usb-linux.c in QEMU before
0.11.1 allows guest OS users to cause a
denial of service (guest OS crash or hang)
or possibly execute arbitrary code on the
host OS via a crafted USB packet.
likely length-related and
therefore likely prevented
by checking packet length,
which is built in
Cont’d
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CVE-2011-0712 Multiple buffer overflows in the caiaq Na-
tive Instruments USB audio functional-
ity in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38-
rc4-next-20110215 might allow attack-
ers to cause a denial of service or
possibly have unspecified other impact
via a long USB device name, related
to (1) the snd usb caiaq audio init func-
tion in sound/usb/caiaq/audio.c and (2)




by checking packet length,
which is built in
CVE-2013-1285 The USB kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft
Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows
Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2,
Windows Server 2008 SP2, R2, and R2
SP1, Windows 7 Gold and SP1, Windows
8, and Windows Server 2012 do not prop-
erly handle objects in memory, which al-
lows physically proximate attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary code by connecting a crafted
USB device, aka “Windows USB Descrip-
tor Vulnerability,” a different vulnerability
than CVE-2013-1286 and CVE-2013-1287.
likely length-related and
therefore likely prevented
by checking packet length,
which is built in
Cont’d
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CVE-2013-1286 The USB kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft
Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows
Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2,
Windows Server 2008 SP2, R2, and R2
SP1, Windows 7 Gold and SP1, Windows
8, and Windows Server 2012 do not prop-
erly handle objects in memory, which al-
lows physically proximate attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary code by connecting a crafted
USB device, aka “Windows USB Descrip-
tor Vulnerability,” a different vulnerability
than CVE-2013-1285 and CVE-2013-1287.
likely length-related and
therefore likely prevented
by checking packet length,
which is built in
CVE-2013-1287 The USB kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft
Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows
Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2,
Windows Server 2008 SP2, R2, and R2
SP1, Windows 7 Gold and SP1, Windows
8, and Windows Server 2012 do not prop-
erly handle objects in memory, which al-
lows physically proximate attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary code by connecting a crafted
USB device, aka “Windows USB Descrip-
tor Vulnerability,” a different vulnerability
than CVE-2013-1285 and CVE-2013-1286.
likely length-related and
therefore likely prevented
by checking packet length,
which is built in
Cont’d
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CVE-2013-3200 The USB drivers in the kernel-mode
drivers in Microsoft Windows XP SP2 and
SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows
Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and
R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Win-
dows Server 2012, and Windows RT al-
low physically proximate attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary code by connecting a crafted




by checking packet length,
which is built in
CVE-2014-8884 Stack-based buffer overflow in the ttus-
bdecfe dvbs diseqc send master cmd
function in drivers/media/usb/ttusb-
dec/ttusbdecfe.c in the Linux kernel
before 3.17.4 allows local users to cause a
denial of service (system crash) or possibly
gain privileges via a large message length
in an ioctl call.
likely length-related and
therefore likely prevented
by checking packet length,
which is built in
CVE-2005-2388 Buffer overflow in a certain USB driver, as
used on Microsoft Windows, allows attack-
ers to execute arbitrary code.
likely length-related and
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CVE-2006-1368 Buffer overflow in the USB Gadget RNDIS
implementation in the Linux kernel be-
fore 2.6.16 allows remote attackers to cause
a denial of service (kmalloc’d memory
corruption) via a remote NDIS response
to OID GEN SUPPORTED LIST, which
causes memory to be allocated for the re-
ply data but not the reply structure
likely length-related and
therefore likely prevented
by checking packet length,
which is built in
CVE-2006-6881 Buffer overflow in the Get Wep function in
cofvnet.c for ATMEL Linux PCI PCMCIA
USB Drivers drivers 3.4.1.1 corruption al-
lows attackers to execute arbitrary code via
a long name argument.
prevented by checking packet




This appendix describes the code I produced for this dissertation. For those keeping track at
home, it amounts to 6410 lines of code (including comments and whitespace), of which 1061 were
automagically generated.
B.1 Injection
As described in Chapter 3, I wrote the software stack that drives the Facedancer USB emulation
board, which has since been used as the basis for industry-leading security-analysis tools such as
umap [21].
I wrote both the library and, to demonstrate its use, a number of sample applications. The
files comprising the library are enumerated in Table B.1 and the applications are enumerated in
Table B.2. As the filenames imply, all code is written in Python.
All the code is available in the public GoodFET repository on github: https://github.com/
travisgoodspeed/goodfet, under the “client” subdirectory.
B.2 Inspection
The instrumentation described in Chapter 4 touched a number of files in the FreeBSD kernel.
Table B.3 shows the extent of the modifications made to each file.
I also wrote a number of scripts to analyze the output of the instrumentation. Those scripts are
described in Table B.4 and are variously Bash, Python, awk, gnuplot, and D (the language used by
DTRACE to manipulate the instrumentation probes).
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filename LOC description
USBClass.py 25 Defines base class (in the object-oriented sense) for defining classes
(in the USB sense) of devices.
USBConfiguration.py 46 Defines base class for describing USB device configurations.
USBDevice.py 360 Defines base class for describing USB devices (as evidence by its
size, the majority of logic is in this class).
USBEndpoint.py 76 Defines base class for describing USB communication endpoints,
analogous to sockets in network programming.
USBInterface.py 98 Defines base class for describing USB interfaces.
USB.py 53 Defines constants used throughout the rest of the library.
USBVendor.py 24 Defines base class for describing USB vendors.
total 682
Table B.1: Files comprising the library I wrote to enable emulating various USB devices using the
Facedancer.
filename LOC description
USBFtdi.py 201 Emulates a USB FTDI (serial) device.
facedancer-ftdi.py 22 Driver program for USBFtdi.py.
USBKeyboard.py 96 Emulates a USB keyboard.
facedancer-keyboard.py 21 Driver program for USBKeyboard.py.
USBMassStorage.py 356 Emulates a USB mass-storage device (e.g., thumbdrive).
facedancer-umass.py 41 Driver program for USBMassStorage.py.
total 737



















Table B.3: Extent of modifications made to apply instrumentation framework described in Chapter 4.
105
filename LOC description
bb-count.d 12 D script to count number of basic-blocks executed.
bb-lint.py 163 Python script to verify the placement of instrumentation probes in the
files listed in Table B.3.
bb-perc.sh 97 Shell script that calculates the percentage of basic blocks exercised, by
file, from a given basic-block trace.
bb-trace.d 50 D script to trace functions called and basic blocks executed while a device
is plugged into a particular USB port.
cam-trace.d 87 D script to trace interactions with FreeBSD’s storage subsystem while a
USB mass storage device is plugged into a particular USB port.
cloc-code.sh 18 Counts lines of code, used as input to other scripts.
extract-bb.sh 31 Shell script that extracts and format basic-block information output by
bb-trace.d.
fbt-count.d 12 D script to count functions called in FreeBSD’s USB stack; replaced
unreliable built-in function boundary testing probes.
fbt-trace.d 8 D script to trace functions called.
group-bb-trace.py 54 Python script that groups the basic-block traces according to module.
indent-bb-trace.py 76 Python script that indents a basic-block trace for easier reading (example
output shown in Figure 4.3).
make-graph.py 52 Python script that uses the result of group-bb-trace.py to generate a
graphviz plot of module (file) interactions (example output shown in
Figure 4.5).
mux-trace.d 56 D script to trace execution paths specifically surrounding the invocation
of callback functions.
normalize.awk 9 Awk script to cleanly format the output of other scripts, used as input
to still more scripts.
plot.p 12 Gnuplot script to graph per-function basic-block activity as generated
by other scripts.
total 737
Table B.4: Scripts used to interact with the instrumentation framework described in Chapter 4 and
to process its output.
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filename LOC description
makePolicy.hs 10 Driver program to create a loadable policy module from a plain-
text policy description.
msgDriver.hs 10 Driver program to generate the header and source files that com-
prise the USB firewall.
Protocol.hs 238 Library that performs the automagic generation.
USBMessages.hs 279 Contains the USB message definitions.
total 537
Table B.5: Hand-written source files for programs that generate the USB firewall.
filename LOC description
usb messages.h 526 Contains data structure definitions, accessor macros, and function
prototypes.
usb messages.c 535 Contains validator functions and pretty-printing functions.
total 1061
Table B.6: The generated USB firewall source files.
B.3 Generation
The Haskell code I wrote to generated the USB firewall is described in Table B.5. The resulting,
generated code is described in Table B.6. The code I wrote to integrate the generated code with
FreeBSD is described in Table B.7.
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filename LOC description
opt usb.h 6 Stub header file necessary to include other kernel-related header
files.
usb conntrack.c 216 Contains the connection-tracking code.
usb conntrack.h 16 Header file for previous.
usb fw.c 94 Contains the code that implements the basic USB firewall.
usb fw fbsd.c 147 FreeBSD-specific shim that acts as a translation layer between the
structures used by FreeBSD to represent USB transfers and the
OS-agnostic USB firewall.
usb fw.h 19 Header file for the OS-agnostic USB firewall code.
util.c 64 Contains utility functions such as bytes as hex, which gives the
contents of an arbitrary chunk of memory as hex.
util.h 12 Header file for previous.
total 573
Table B.7: Hand-written source files that facilitate integration of the USB firewall with FreeBSD.
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